

SHARING THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATIVE AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES WITH OUTSIDERS IN PERU: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SAIS CAHUIDE

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One of the greatest problems in the establishment of a national system of worker-controlled cooperatives has been the harmonization of the workers' interest with the general interest. Often, like the previous capitalist owners of the enterprise, workers in cooperatives concentrate on increasing their profits and neglect the needs of non-members, even though these outsiders are near-by.¹⁾ Such neglect is an especially serious difficulty in poor, agrarian nations, where permanent workers in an enterprise, even in traditional, paternalistic haciendas, live better than the significant percentages of the population who are isolated from substantial economic enterprise. In Peru, for example, roughly half the agrarian population (about one-quarter of the entire population) live at subsistence levels as small, independent farmers in dispersed peasant communities.²⁾

To move towards a solution to this problem, the SAIS («Sociedad Agrícola de Interés Social» — Agrarian Social Interest Society) has been developed in Peru. The SAIS unites in one enterprise both the former agrarian workers on haciendas and poorer contiguous peasant communities. In the traditional Latin American agrarian cooperative based on former enterprise members, these poorer peasant communities would remain outsiders, but the Peruvian SAIS includes a substantial number in. The SAIS, however, does not solve the problem

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¹⁾ Neglect of the needs of outsiders has been noted in cooperatives of many nations. The rejection of incorporation of temporary workers into the cooperative has been a frequent example of hostility, observed in Mexico, Chile, Israel, and the United States, among other nations. See R. Wilkie, *San Miguel: A Mexican Collective Ejido*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1971, 85—90; N. S. Chincilla and M. Sternberg, «The Agrarian Reform and Campesino Consciousness: *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Summer, 1974), 106—128; P. Bernstein, «Run Your Own Business: Worker—Owned Plywood Firms,» *Working Papers*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer, 1974), 28—82.

²⁾ See R. Webb, «Trends in Real Income in Peru, 1950—1966,» Discussion Paper No. 41, Research Program in Economic Development, Princeton University, 1974, and A. Figueroa, «El Impacto de las Reformas Actuales sobre la Distribución de Ingresos en el Perú,» in Alejandro Foxley, ed., *Distribución del Ingreso*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico, 1974, 392—414.

In 1969—1970, the major goal of the agrarian reform appeared to be an increase in agricultural efficiency and production. Only the largest agrarian enterprises, predominantly foreign-owned, were expropriated; they were re-established as »cooperatives,« but predominant power was granted to technicians and government officials.⁴⁾ The workers angrily rejected the new enterprises as sham, and the government changed the legal framework of the cooperatives, devolving more power to workers.

As the social and economic benefits of the new cooperatives became apparent, smaller and more isolated groups of peasants began to press for adjudications. The government was responsive. Although the original 1969 decree law⁵⁾ stipulated generous area limits to enterprises — 150 hectares of irrigated coastal land and 15 to 55 hectares elsewhere, depending on the province — new laws stiffened many of the provisions. Fair treatment of labor was required and efficiency stopped to be regarded as basis for non-expropriation. New landowners (specifically, former sharecroppers — »feudatarios«) were limited to holdings of 50 hectares; in 1973 in many coastal areas to 15 hectares. As a result, the same number of hectares was expropriated in the 18-odd months from June, 1972 to December, 1973 as in the entire decade from 1962 to June, 1972. (See Appendix 1.) Of the total 497 cooperatives adjudicated by December 31, 1973, almost half were processed during the last year, 1973. During 1974, the pace of expropriation slowed, but new peasant demands at the end of 1974 encouraged the transfer of more committed agrarian reform personnel to offices in the dilatory regions, and affectations increased again.

Table 1

Advance of the Peruvian Agrarian Reform up to April 30, 1975*)

Land

Total hectares usable for cultivation or pasture	29,000,000
Hectares expropriable under 1969 Reform Law	12,677,018
Hectares expropriated by April, 1975 (excludes jungle colonization)	6,664,308
Hectares in cooperatives**) by April, 1975 (includes jungle colonization)	4,769,536

⁴⁾ Alberti and J. Cotler, *La Reforma Agraria en las Haciendas Azucareras*, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima, 1972.

⁵⁾ Decreto Ley # 17716, Direccion General de Reforma Agraria y Asentamiento Rural, Lima, 1971.

People

Total Rural Farm Families	1,450,000
Families to Benefit from Expropriations under 1969 law	340,000
Families receiving land under 1969 law by April, 1975 (excludes jungle colonizers)	220,511
Families in cooperatives*) by April, 1975	166,811
Private medium-size farmers, owning land beyond the family unit and employing labor	100,000
Private small farmers, using only family labor	275,000
Peasant community members	500,000
Jungle families	150,000

*) Sources: See Appendix 1.

**) »Cooperatives« include CAP, SAIS, and »Peasant Groups.« Peasant communities are excluded as they do not typically make production and investment decisions as one enterprise.

As we can calculate from Table 1, by April 1975, land expropriations constituted about 22% of total land area in Peru, and the number of families who had benefitted from the expropriations amounted to roughly 15% of all rural farm families. Although these percentages indicate that greater efforts are necessary, they compare favorably with agrarian reforms in all Latin American nations except Cuba. Although the legal limits on land ownership have been slightly lower in both Mexico and Chile (under Frei and Allende), several stipulations allowed the landowner elite to escape relatively unscathed. In Chile, for example, the elite retained »reserves« of up to 80 »Basic Irrigated Hectares« (the equivalent of 500 non-irrigated hectares), usually the land with the most capital facilities. Sub-divisions of farms among family members also seemed more common than in Peru. While the 2,800,000 expropriated hectares in Chile brought 75,000 families into cooperatives, the 4,769,536 expropriated hectares in Peru cooperativized double that number. Whereas about 15% of all families have already received land in Peru, only around 9% in Chile did so through 1973. In the next few years, the Peruvian reform is due to affect almost twice as many hectares and families as it had by mid-1975. (Appendix 1 provides sources and details.)

Despite the achievements of the Peruvian reforms, the majority of rural families will not benefit from the 1969 law. About 40% of the Peruvian peasant families work in small highlands plots of 1 or 2 hectares, sending their sons to coastal enterprises as migrant labor for small daily wages. Peasant communities are to be »re-structured« through a statute that disqualifies rich traders and non-residents from community membership and establishes political organizations for all members. Although this statute is spottily implemented in most communities, it has stimulated some political reform. Still, it has not contributed to these poor communities economically; supported and often mobilized by leftist intellectuals, the peasants have increasingly demanded economic gains.

In 1972—1973, the government appeared to aspire to meet the needs of poorer peasants to a greater extent. New regional political organizations, the Agrarian Leagues («Ligas Agrarias»), were developed. These included temporary workers and small farmers as well as cooperative members. New economic institutions that would redistribute profits from the most lucrative cooperatives to their poorer neighbors were also devised: on the local level the «central cooperative», on the regional level, — the PIAR («Proyecto Integral de Asentamiento Rural» — Project of Integrated Rural Settlement).⁶⁾ Jealous of their new prerogatives, however, the cooperative members have resisted incorporation into these re-distributive institutions. Thus, although the PIAR is potentially an effective mechanism for benefitting many more rural Peruvian families, its implementation has been slow.

2. The Establishment of the SAIS

By the developing and implementing to an increasing degree, the SAIS type of cooperative, it was also aspired to extend benefits to poorer peasants.⁷⁾ In contrast to the CAP, an organization constituted only by the members of the former capitalist enterprise, the SAIS unites these enterprises with previously independent peasant communities. In Peru, agrarian workers salaried in «haciendas» (farm enterprises) were generally more prosperous — certainly economically more secure — than peasants in independent communities, although politically and socially hacienda workers were often more repressed. Because the haciendas had unjustly usurped peasant communities' land and continued to prohibit the «trespassing» of independent peasants' animals on this land, independent peasants resented the haciendas, and often felt that peasants who accepted positions in the haciendas had sold out. By integrating the ex-haciendas and the peasant communities, the SAIS aspires to restore the original equality among highlands peasants. Since this particular socio-economic configuration exists largely in the highlands', the SAIS are more common there. As the Peruvian highlands are most appropriate for pasture, the SAIS are usually sheep and/or cow-raising enterprises, producing wool, meat, and dairy products.

By April 1975, 50 SAIS comprising 2,246,568 hectares and 55,010 families had been adjudicated. In contrast, the traditional cooperative modes, CAP («Agrarian Production Cooperative») and «Grupos Campesinos» («Peasant Groups») had been designated for 653 enterprises, including 2,416,000 hectares and 107,792 families. The SAIS accounts for roughly 48% of the total amount of cooperatively adjudicated land, but only for 33% of the total number of families in cooperatives (about 3% of all Peruvian farm families). The greater significance of SAIS in terms of land than people derives from the location of SAIS in the pasture lands of the Peruvian mountains. (See Appendix 1.)

⁶⁾ See Pedro Ortiz, «PIAR,» unpublished manuscript, CENCIRA, Lima, 1973; and «The Peruvian Times,» May 25, 1973.

⁷⁾ See P. Ortiz, «SAIS,» CENCIRA, Lima, 1973, and Decreto Ley #17716, esp. pp. 241—259.

The exact character of the SAIS was a question of some debate during the first years of the military government. In determining the extent of re-distribution to peasant communities afforded by the SAIS several issues were especially significant.

One issue was the degree of integration between the ex-haciendas and the peasant communities. The communities hoped their land and animals would physically re-integrate with those of the haciendas, and would completely restore their original socioeconomic equality. The government rejected this possibility on economic grounds: The independent peasants' sheep are often diseased, and might infect hacienda animals, reducing their value. Further, technical procedures would be dislocated to a greater extent. However, officially, the SAIS is a transitional »pre-cooperative« enterprise; it is planned that as the communities develop and improve their animals, they will be physically integrated with the ex-haciendas. Also, while the communities did not gain new lands or animals, they were not asked to work on the ex-haciendas or contribute to SAIS production in any other way, except in a few cases of several days' labor to large projects benefitting them as well (such as a road).

The formal political structure of the SAIS was also an important issue. The government consciously tried to strengthen the political role of the independent communities in the SAIS and to enlarge their share of SAIS profits. To this end, each community is formally considered one »member« of the SAIS, whereas all ex-haciendas are combined into one legal body, the CS (»Cooperativa de Servicios« — Service Cooperative), which is also only one »member«. Since each »member« entity elects two delegates to the key SAIS organ (the General Assembly) and each »member« entity receives roughly similar percentages of SAIS profits, as a group the communities have more representatives and gain more profits; the exact extent of the communities' advantage depending on their number in the SAIS.

As the degree of re-distribution varies with the number of communities in the SAIS, this number is important. However, the procedures for its determination are vague. Because of this vagueness, it appears that some ex-haciendas have manipulated Agrarian Reform personnel to consolidate »SAIS« that in fact include no peasant communities at all, thus violating the definition of »SAIS.« This violation has occurred especially in isolated regions, such as Puno. In the more closely supervised areas, however, a typical SAIS includes 10 independent peasant communities, sufficient to insure their dominance. SAIS Cahuide includes 29, more than in any other SAIS; the great number enlarges the share of profits and power for the communities to the point of monopoly. The inclusion of so many communities was spurred by the greater number of profitable ex-haciendas (seven) in Cahuide, which was motivated by the desire for economies of scale and by the fear of disrupting the previous technical dependence among the ex-haciendas.

Procedures for the selection of peasant communities into the SAIS also proved a significant issue. Although too small a number vio-

lates the meaning of the SAIS, it is feared that too large a number might overly dilute the amount of power and profits available to each community. However, many peasant communities surround ex-haciendas in Peru, and most have wanted membership. Criteria for inclusion remain somewhat vague, but have gradually favored poorer communities to a greater extent. Originally, the key criterion was the communities' »vindication«: communities that had suffered the seizure of their land by the haciendas had to be avenged. However, it became apparent that these communities were often not economically the poorest. Thus, to attain economic justice as well as legal justice, the Agrarian Reform personnel adopted two different sets of criteria for the communities' integration into the SAIS: one set (for initial membership) emphasizes proximity to the ex-haciendas and a history of boundary conflicts with them, and a second set (for the share of SAIS profits) focuses on poverty.⁸⁾

In SAIS Cahuide, these criteria were implemented with varying degrees of effectiveness. At least six relatively prosperous communities were admitted only on the basis of their historical conflicts with the haciendas. On the other hand, with one exception, all the very wealthy communities of the fertile Mantaro Valley were rejected. The average annual family income in an admitted community was roughly S/ 6000* and in a rejected community S/ 9000.⁹⁾ The criteria for the establishment of profit shares aim to set the profit level in inverse proportion to the community's wealth. They were difficult to implement, however, because Agrarian Reform personnel tried to set the economic level of a community through biased sets of survey data, thus compiling complex but meaningless calculations and ignoring the implications of common observation.

3. The Structure of the Peruvian Agrarian Cooperative, 1972—1974

Similar principles and organs of workers' control define various modes of Peruvian agrarian cooperatives — »restructured« peasant communities, CAP, and SAIS (and non-agrarian cooperatives as well, such as the new Social Property enterprises). The basic institutions of workers' control also resemble closely the Yugoslav one and those of the Chilean »asentamiento« and the Mexican »ejido.«¹⁰⁾

The Peruvian cooperative abolishes private ownership in favor of »social ownership.« The enterprise is owned by its members, for all practical purposes upon adjudication and legally upon payment of

⁸⁾ Ortiz, *op. cit.*, appendices.

^{*}) The exchange rate during 1969—1975. has remained at S/ 43 = \$ 1.00.

⁹⁾ See *Proyecto Sociedad Gauadera del Centro: Datos Para Adjudicacion and Datos Para el Desarrollo*, Direccion de Comunidades Campesinas, Ministry of Agriculture, Lima, 1970. Calculations are based on the figures in *Datos*, pp. 66—67.

¹⁰⁾ Legal guidelines for the Peruvian cooperatives are provided in Decreto Ley 17716 and Decreto Ley 20136, Direccion General de Reforma Agraria y Asentamiento Rural, Lima. An excellent elucidation is D. Horton, »Land Reform and Reform Enterprises in Peru,« unpublished report, Wisconsin Land Tenure Center, June, 1974, pp. 37—60. On Social Property in Peru, see Decreto Ley 20598, *Expreso*, 5/3/1974. On Mexico, see Wilkie, *op. cit.*; and K. Steenland, »Rural Strategy Under Allende,« *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (summer, 1974); and G. Hunnius, D. Garson, and J. Case, *Workers' Control*, Vintage, New York, 1973.

purchase debts. In agrarian cooperatives, purchase debts typically include the price of the land and the capital equipment, paid over twenty to thirty years or more after a typical grace period of two years. The agrarian debt includes interest payments, but no adjustment for inflation. The government reimburses the former owners through bonds, paid over twenty years without inflation adjustments. It is generally agreed that the assessment of enterprises was low.

By law, the final authority of the cooperative is the General Assembly («Asamblea General») which depending on the size of the cooperative includes all members or elected representatives. The Assembly meets two to five times a year, to deliberate and then formally vote approval or rejection of major proposals advanced by higher organs. Typical agenda include the budget, investment plans, production policies, and decisions about technical personnel. The Assembly also elects the two higher workers' organs, the Administrative Council («Consejo de Administración») and the Vigilance Council («Consejo de Vigilancia»). Each cooperative member has one vote; major votes are usually made anonymously.

Positions on the Administrative Council and the Vigilance Council are limited to two years, to inhibit the rise of a workers' elite. The Administrative Council includes eight-odd members and typically meets weekly. It discusses alternative policies with technicians, chooses one, and ultimately submits it to the General Assembly for approval. It also is largely responsible, in practice, for hiring and firing technicians. Further, it appoints members to special committees — the education committee, the marketing committee, and many ad hoc committees. However, in most cooperatives, these committees have functioned sporadically. The Vigilance Council must check for any legal or financial irregularities in the activities of the cooperative, especially in those of the Administrative Council. In practice, however, the Vigilance Council often fails to understand its function, meets rarely, and establishes friendship ties with the Administrative Council that impede aggressive supervision.

These organs bear the decision-making responsibility in the Peruvian system. Like the Yugoslav one, however, the Peruvian cooperative divides responsibilities into two spheres: 1) making decisions and 2) providing relevant technical information and implementing the decisions.¹¹⁾ This second set of responsibilities belongs to the technicians. Workers control the technicians, because the Administrative Council is authorized to hire and fire all professional personnel, except the «Gerente» (top manager), a position to which the Council nominates three candidates, one of whom is selected by the Ministry of Agriculture. In practice, however, agrarian workers have resented the role of the manager, an outsider who reminds them of the «patrón» (former boss), and in many cases either choose their favorite themselves or,

¹¹⁾ This distinction was first developed by Ichak Adizes, with reference to the Yugoslav case. See I. Adizes, *Industrial Democracy: Yugoslav Style*, Free Press, New York, 1971, and «Relaciones organizativas en la empresa autogestionaria,» *Apuntes*, Año 1, No. 2 (1974), pp. 21-31.

by firing one rapidly and delaying to propose new ones, usually lack a manager. In December, 1973, 42% of SAIS did not employ a qualified manager.¹²⁾ These difficulties stimulated the more stringent requirements for firing the manager in the Social Property law.

Several structural provisions are unique to the SAIS. First, the ex-haciendas are combined into their own political and economic entity, the CS, that debates and decides internal questions of the ex-haciendas and tries to facilitate commercial arrangements for the ex-haciendas. It functions essentially like the other Peruvian cooperatives, except within the larger context of the SAIS. Second, SAIS members are not individual persons, as in most cooperatives, but legal entities: one is the CS and all the others are the constituent peasant communities. As we have noted, this legal mechanism facilitates re-distributive efforts in favor of the communities. Third, major SAIS include a special department of technicians, the »Development Division«, whose responsibility is to plan and implement social and economic projects for the peasant communities.

During 1973, the regional political organizations, Agrarian Leagues, were established, including not only the agrarian cooperatives but some temporary workers and small farmers. In October, 1974, representatives of these Leagues met in Lima, at the CNA (»Confederación Nacional Agraria« — National Agrarian Confederation). The Leagues provide the government with greater facilities for subverting opposition agrarian groups and channeling more support for its own positions. Simultaneously, however, the Leagues have offered cooperative members the opportunity to convene, converse, and perceive the common interests of the agrarian sector as a whole. The 1974 CNA vociferously demanded an acceleration of the agrarian reform, improved credit facilities (including a re-organization of the Agrarian Bank), more highly skilled technicians, and non-payment of the agrarian debt.

To what extent does the government intervene in the agrarian cooperatives? The degree of intervention appears to have gradually decreased. Even in 1974, however, the government retained key powers with regard to what it saw as critical decisions with national implications. It held ultimate authority for the development of new institutions for Peru, such as the Social Property enterprises. It can try to undercut the role of previous organizations through the establishment of new institutions. With respect to the agrarian cooperatives themselves, government technicians in the Agrarian Bank allot credit, and thus they essentially approve of all major investments. Commercialization of important products especially export goods such as sugar and wool is often controlled. If salary levels are co-ordinated for an entire region as a whole, government officials generally try to monitor increases. However, the Agrarian Leagues and the CNA are increasingly providing the cooperatives with a forum from which to negotiate these national agrarian policies.

¹²⁾ »Empresas con Administradores Nombrados en el Sistema de Ley,« Dirección de Producción, Ministry of Agriculture, Lima, December, 1973.

With regard to less important cooperative issues, whose implications are predominantly internal, the military government rarely intervenes. The official agrarian organizations are often at cross purposes, and lack the personnel and the transportation facilities to regularly and effectively monitor the internal affairs of the cooperatives. It is easy for a cooperative to evade many official requirements, such as that for a technical manager.

SAIS CAHUIDE: THE EFFORT TO INTEGRATE AND EQUALIZE ITS CONSTITUENT GROUPS

To evaluate the effectiveness of the SAIS as an integrative cooperative, we now turn to explore in greater detail the experience of one SAIS, SAIS Cahuide. After observing the vast political and economic inequalities between the various groups in the region prior to 1969, we will probe to what extent the SAIS has reduced these inequalities and brought the groups together.

First, what are the basic characteristics of SAIS Cahuide? The seven ex-haciendas and twenty-nine communities are dispersed; many communities lack roads, and are more than a day's travel from other communities. The sites are located in high altitudes, circling the Mantaro Valley and its major provincial city, Huancayo. Only five hours from Lima by car, the Mantaro Valley is the most prosperous region of the Peruvian highlands. SAIS Cahuide itself is one of the three largest livestock enterprises in Peru; its total value is about six times that of a typical SAIS in poorer regions.¹³⁾

A Profile of SAIS Cahuide¹⁴⁾

Adjudication Date	24/4/71
Number of Families	3,772
In communities	3,237
In ex-haciendas	535
Total land	269,155 has.
In communities	111,503 has.
In ex-haciendas	157,652 has.
Number of Legal Members	29 communities
	1 Service Cooperative (CAS)
Adjudication value	S/237,416,956

¹³⁾ Figure for SAIS Cahuide from C. Aramburu and H. Cacycho, *Estudio Comparativo de SAIS Tupac Amaru y SAIS Cahuide*, CENCIRA, Lima, 1973, p. 15, and for typical SAIS, from *Reforma Agraria en Cifras*, Direccion de Reforma Agraria y Asentamiento Rural, Ministry of Agriculture, Lima, January 31, 1973.

¹⁴⁾ Aramburu and Cacycho, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-20.

Work in the SAIS remains very similar to that before 1969. In the ex-haciendas, the majority of workers are shepherds, who live under the most arduous circumstances, moving from hut to hut in the highest altitudes to watch the grazing sheep. The shepherds are supervised by »caporales,« who in turn report to »mayordomos.« The larger enterprises also employ »operarios,« who are responsible for various tasks around the hacienda, such as carpentry and butchery. White-collar employees, many of whom are accountants, work in the Huancayo office. The shepherds have traditionally enjoyed the least prestige and income, »mayordomos« and »operarios« more, and white-collar employees the most. In the communities, the average peasant family cultivates potatoes, butchers some of its sheep, and perhaps milks a cow. Cash for consumers' goods (radios and shoes are common in all Mantaro sites) is earned from temporary work, peddling luxury food such as strawberries in Lima, laboring on a high-jungle coffee enterprise, or the like.

1. Power and Wealth in the Region Before SAIS Cahuide

The seven haciendas that comprise SAIS Cahuide were consolidated around 1930, with the growth of the international wool market. The haciendas unjustly usurped the land of peasant communities for their own enterprises. The owners generally did not live on the haciendas, but in Lima, and they employed technicians as managers. The top technicians were generally very capable and powerful men; one General Manager has served in Lima as the area's Senator. To the extent that the technicians continued to provide sufficient profits to the enterprise owners, they were given full responsibility for the management of the enterprise.

From the 1930's through the Second World War, political and economic inequities were at their most extreme; workers were paid almost nothing in cash, and depended upon the technicians — in this case, their patrons — for permission to graze a few of their own coarse-bred sheep (»huacchas«) on hacienda land as their »payment.« In the late 1940's the Bustamente Presidency promised reforms; in the Huancayo area and elsewhere, independent peasant communities invaded hacienda lands and workers began to organize. The nascent political efforts of the independent peasants were repressed by the police, and the workers' leaders were fired or co-opted.¹⁵⁾

In the early 1960's the price of wool sky-rocketed, and the haciendas were extremely lucrative. Profits easily climbed to \$ 200,000; over 70% of all income generated by the enterprises went to the owners.¹⁶⁾

¹⁵⁾ These events are recounted in the correspondence of the major hacienda, the Sociedad Ganadera del Centro, assembled in the Hacienda Archive in Lima. Repression of peasants in Peru is notorious. See J. Cotler and Portocarrero, *Peru: Peasant Organizations*, in H. A. Landsberger, ed., *Latin American Peasant Movements*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1969, esp. pp. 312—313.

¹⁶⁾ C. McClintock, »SAIS Cahuide: Its Impact on Power and Wealth in the Huancayo Region,« in Giorgio Alberti, ed., *La Reforma Agraria en el Peru*, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima, 1975. (forthcoming).

Given these profit rates, the enterprises could afford to assure the loyalty of their workers by raising their benefits substantially above that of independent peasants. To prevent »excessive« demands, however, the technicians as patrons distributed benefits to individual clients: They would »give« the worker meat, or butter, or permission to graze more »huacchas,« if the worker approached the technician humbly and, most significantly, individually. This system of differential favoritism,¹⁷⁾ supported by the prohibition of leftist political agitators from the haciendas, prevented effectively political organization among the workers during the 1960's.

Table 2

Monthly Income for Individuals, 1969¹⁸⁾

(in soles at 1969 prices, S/43 = \$ 1.00)

	General Manager	Top Admini- strator	Lower-level Employee	Class 1 Worker	Class 2 Worker
Salary	40,000	16,000	3,000	750	500
Meat, milk butter	2,800	2,800	1,200	1,200	320
»huacchas«	—	4,000	2,500	1,500	600
fringe benefits: Vehicle, school, house, annual bene- fits benefits, so- cial security, etc.	40,000	6,000	700	250	100
Total	82,800	28,800	7,400	3,700	1,520

The system of differential favoritism permitted huge income inequalities between different kinds of workers. Because so much income was received in kind, it is difficult to estimate the differences exactly. However, we estimate that, in 1969, top administrators received about 8 times as much income as a privileged or »Class 1« worker (the 125-odd »caporales«, »mayordomos« and operarios at the two major haciendas, and the 50-odd »mayordomos« and specialized »operarios« at the five minor haciendas) and about 15 times as much as the non-privileged or »Class 2« worker (the 375-odd other workers).

¹⁷⁾ Descriptions of the system of differential favoritism in other Peruvian haciendas are found in J. Cotler, »Actuales pautas de cambio en la sociedad rural del Peru,« and G. Alberti and F. Fuenzalida, »Pluralismo, dominacion, y personalidad,« both in *Dominacion y Cambios en el Peru Rural*, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima, 1969, pp. 60-79 and pp. 285-325.

¹⁸⁾ For derivation of figures, see McClintock, »SAIS Cahuide,« *op. cit.*, appendices.

Although the peasant communities had originally contributed their best lands to the haciendas, in the 1960's they received few benefits from them. Fearing repression, the peasant communities' political resource against the haciendas was legal suits for land.¹⁹⁾ Their legal efforts motivated the haciendas to provide the communities with some minor benefits, given to individual client communities as to individual client workers, in order to discourage political organization. The benefits to peasant communities included: use of hacienda machinery, lenient treatment of »huacchas« trespassing on »hacienda« land, cheap sale of meat and milk, free animal forage, and sports trophies. Yet, it is estimated that even the ten most successful peasant communities were only able to win roughly two-tenths of one percent of the total income generated by the haciendas.

Table 3

Monthly Income for Different Groups, 1969²⁰⁾
(in soles at 1969 prices)

	Number in Group	Total Individual Income <u>Depends on shares held</u>	Total Group Income	Perce- tage of Total Income
Owners	50		572,850	24
Top Administrators	10	28,800	288,000	12
Lower level employees	35	7,400	260,000	11
Class 1 Worker	175	3,700	647,500	27
Class 2 Worker	375	1,520	570,000	24
Temporary Workers	?	?	20,000	1
Communities	10	500	5,000	.2
(per community)				
Total Monthly Income Genera- ted by Haciendas			2,362,850	

For the bulk of their income, then, the peasant communities depended on their lands and animals that were not taken by the haciendas. Because of the greater population density in the communities, however, the typical independent peasant earned significantly less than

¹⁹⁾ J. Martinez Alier, *Los Huachilleros del Peru*, Reudo Iberico, Madrid, 1974.

²⁰⁾ For the derivation of figures, see McClintock, *op. cit.*, appendices.

his hacienda counterpart. The average annual income in a Huancayo area community has been estimated at roughly S/ 7,500;²¹⁾ this figure is certainly low, reflecting the peasants' under-estimation of their income to government agencies due to fear of higher taxes, but even doubling this figure would barely bring their average annual income to half that of the typical hacienda worker, estimated at S/ 26,550. A 1970 nutrition study found that an average independent peasant spent for food about 80% as much as an average hacienda worker.²²⁾ Given the history of conflict between the haciendas and the independent communities, and the fact that many hacienda workers were born in communities, it is not surprising that independent peasants resented the hacienda workers, often feeling that they had betrayed their own community and sacrificed their pride for the economic benefits of the hacienda.

2. Independent Peasants, Ex-hacienda Workers, and Technicians in SAIS Cahuide

This section will trace the evolution of the struggle between the independent peasants, the ex-hacienda workers, and technicians for the political power and economic wealth of SAIS Cahuide. We will contend that, gradually, the SAIS has brought significant benefits to the independent peasants, giving them predominant political power, and, while not equalizing incomes, moving in this direction. Through the process of conflict resolution, the various groups seem to have perceived the importance of more general issues that might unite them.

After so many decades of economic and political subjugation, the independent peasants eagerly sought to consolidate their position in the SAIS immediately upon adjudication.²³⁾ With 58 representatives in the General Assembly from the communities and two from the ex-haciendas, the independent peasants easily dominated this body, and elected only independent peasants to the Administrative Council and Vigilance Council. Their first move was to assert their dominance over the technicians. Politically, they feared that the technicians would try to be new patrons, running the SAIS covertly. Economically, they did not perceive the need for the technicians, and quickly calculated that their profits would be directly enlarged by a decrease in technicians' salaries. Thus, during 1971—1972, with the approval of the General Assembly, the Administrative Council fired or encouraged the resignation of almost half the SAIS technicians. While originally it employed sixteen people, the Development Division included only an average of eight during 1973. Most important, the top manager («gerente») was fired, despite his technical competence, largely because the indepen-

²¹⁾ «SAIS Cahuide: Datos para la Adjudicacion», *op. cit.*, pp. 66—67.

²²⁾ «Informe de Los Estudios Dieteticos Realizados en Talhuis, Pucara, Cullpa Cochis, Chico, Chongos Bajo, Acopalca y Laive», Institutos Nacionales de Salud, Instituto de Nutricion, Lima, 1971. The cost of consumption of the food on the marketplace was calculated.

²³⁾ The conflict between the various constituent SAIS groups during its first two years is emphasized in R. Montoya, *et. al.*, *La SAIS Cahuide y Sus Contradicciones*, Universidad Nacional de San Marcos, Lima, 1974.

dent peasants felt him to be arrogant. The Administrative Council selected a new top manager largely on the basis of his reticence and humility. Further, it reduced the salaries of both the top manager and the assistant top manager 25%, with massive vote approvals in the General Assembly.

During 1971—1972, the independent peasants also tried to enlarge enterprise profits at the expense of the ex-hacienda workers. They voted to limit the number of »huacchas« permitted to each worker, a policy that would increase the amount of grazing land available to enterprise animals. The rations of meat and milk formerly allotted to workers were reduced. Salaries were not increased, although inflation was substantial. When a delegation of ex-hacienda workers presented a list of demands at an emergency General Assembly in May, 1973, the independent peasants paid no heed. Afterwards, ex-hacienda workers complained angrily of their political impotence: »If we had one patron before, now we have thousands of patrones . . . We have only two representatives. The others don't listen to us. The President [of the Administrative Council] has the power.«

Not surprisingly, during 1972—1973, independent peasants were much more positive about the SAIS than the ex-hacienda workers. In a survey during June—September, 1973²⁴⁾ respondents in two independent communities and one ex-hacienda were asked if, in comparison with five years ago, their site was better or worse. Significantly more people in the communities felt it was better. In one of the two communities, 58% of the respondents said that the site was better now. The respondents in the communities generally pointed to their share of SAIS profits as a reason for improvement; during 1973, these profits had become visible in projects selected in each community by votes in general assemblies: medical posts, roads, drinkable water, market cooperatives.

Table 4

(percentages)*)

In comparison with five years ago, is this place now ...? :

	Worse	Same	Better	Don't know, no answer, etc.
Independent communities	7	55	36	3
ex-hacienda	29	50	10	11

*) Number of respondents in independent communities is 93, and in the ex-haciendas 79.

²⁴⁾ For a detailed discussion of the survey, see C. McClintock, »The Impact of Agrarian Cooperatives on Members' Attitudes and Behavior in Peru,« Ph. D. dissertation, M. I. T., 1975.

Although the ex-hacienda workers had not organized politically for decades, the SAIS freed them to do so, and during 1973—1974, they were doing that increasingly. Through their service cooperative (the CS), the ex-haciendas saved their share of SAIS profits for potential use as a strike fund; by March, 1974, they had collected S/ 100,000, a substantial sum. A union was organized, and met on the major ex-haciendas almost every week, to plan their demands on the SAIS. Although at first the union enlisted largely richer workers, who had been hurt most seriously by the SAIS wage policy, gradually the poorer shepherds joined as well. Many technicians were persuaded of the justice of the workers' cause.

By mid-1973, the independent peasants had generally wrought their vengeance on the technicians and on the ex-hacienda workers; the peasants' dominance of Cahuide was assured. However, it was increasingly apparent that the SAIS as an economic unit could deteriorate: the most capable technicians had left and the workers might strike. The economic performance of the SAIS had not yet declined, and profits were good because of high prices for wool and meat, but it had not increased²⁵⁾ as had been hoped originally: in fact, the productivity of the former haciendas had been quite acceptable and, without major investments such as irrigation canals, was difficult to improve. Yet, in three years the SAIS was supposed to begin agrarian debt payment, and, if profits or inflation did not jump in that period, the debt could wipe out the communities' profits. (The total debt is S/ 237, 416, 956, plus interest payments of S/ 92, 085, 492.) Further, although the communities were pleased with their new projects launched through SAIS profits, they realized that despite all their efforts, these profits were still too small to transform all 29 communities in a few years. A new medical post was helpful, but not a panacea.

As the better educated peasants analyzed their economic future, they began to realize that their prosperity would lie less in immediate profit maximization and more in new investments, better commercialization, and non-payment of the agrarian debt. It was also apparent that, to gain these ends, cooperation with the technicians and the ex-hacienda workers would be helpful: government officials would be more responsive to a united front of pressure and influence. In June, 1973, the General Assembly elected a more highly educated Administrative Council, and this Council chose a Huancayo university student as its President, who was recognized to be a much more diplomatic person than the previous president with greater concern for the conciliation of the various groups in the enterprise and for its general economic advancement.

In the last half of 1973 and 1974, the new Council moved substantially towards conciliation. It hired many new technicians, although a new breed: the previous technicians were older, white men, usually graduates of the most prestigious agricultural-livestock university in Lima; the new ones tended to be young and mestizo, recent graduates

²⁵⁾ C. McClintock, »SAIS Cahuide,« *op. cit.*, section 5.

of mediocre highlands universities. With this new variety of technician, the independent peasants felt more comfortable, and paid lower salaries. The new Council also satisfied many of the demands of the workers' union. One ex-hacienda asked for the dismissal of a distrusted SAIS social assistant; the assistant was transferred. A September, 1973, General Assembly agreed (24 to 14) to reimburse workers for the sacrifice of their »huacchas.« Most important, at the March, 1974 General Assembly, a wage increase of roughly 50% was approved. For the first time, absolutely larger wages were given to shepherds, whose work is more arduous than the »operarios«, the basis of the system of differential favoritism, already undermined by the decline in goods payment, was thus totally destroyed. The principle of workers' political participation in the SAIS was accepted; 18 were invited to the March Assembly. Two positions of the Administrative Council were reserved for workers.

Yet, even after these reconciliations with the technicians and the workers, the SAIS had brought a substantial redistribution of wealth from the ex-owners and top administrators in favor of the peasant communities, especially the peasant leadership. The SAIS also raised the economic position of the former »Class 2« worker to that of the »Class 1« worker, not only through salary raises but by concentrating new schools and houses in the poorer ex-haciendas. Whereas in 1969 a top technician earned about 12 times as much as an average worker, in 1974 he made about 6 times as much.

Table 5

Monthly income for individuals, 1974²⁶⁾

(in soles at 1974 prices)

	Top Manager	Higher- Level Techni- cian	Lower- Level Employee	Ex- Hacienda Worker	Peasant Leader	Peasant
Salary	32,000	17,000	5,100	2,400	5,000	—
Meat, Milk, Butter	1,080	1,080	1,080	640	—	—
»Huacchas«	—	—	—	750	—	—
Fringe Benefits: houses, school, other investments and benefits	6,000	3,500	700	450	1,000	125
TOTAL	39,080	21,580	6,880	4,240	6,000	125

²⁶⁾ *Ibid.*, section 5, and appendices.

Changes in the total income of different groups are more difficult to calculate, especially because of the uncertainty of agrarian debt payment. Substantial sums are now being saved for the debt, reducing the amount of money available for the communities. However, our estimates of changes in monthly income for different groups provide a rough indication of the total re-distributive effort from owners and technicians to peasants.

Table 6

Monthly income for different groups, 1969 and 1974²⁷⁾

(in soles at 1969 and 1974 prices)

	Number in group, 1969	Total group income, 1969	% of total Generated income, 1969	Number in group, 1974	Total group income, 1974	% of total income, 1974
Ex-owners, government*)	?	572,850	24	?	306,966	9
Technicians	10	288,000	12	15	323,700	9
Low-level Employees	35	260,000	11	48	330,240	9
Workers	550	1,217,500	51	485	2,056,400	56
Temporary workers	?	20,000	1	44	44,000	1
Peasant Leaders	—	—	—	12	72,000	2
Peasants	1,500	5,000	.2	4,350	500,000	14
Total	—	2,440,850	100	—	3,632,706	100

* (In 1974, money is received indirectly through debt. Other taxes are included here.)

With greater integration of the SAIS achieved, during 1974 the various groups were able to press together against government officials on more significant issues. The SAIS wanted to improve their wool commercialization procedures. First, it united with the three other major SAIS of the central highlands to demand permission to sell wool on the international market, where prices were double that of the domestic market. After several meetings, the government agreed to allow 50% of the wool to be sold abroad. Then, the SAIS leaders asked for the development of a wool factory within Cahuide, a factory that would

²⁷⁾ *Ibid.*, section 5, and appendices.

increase the value of the wool to the SAIS and employ independent peasants. Government officials and SAIS technicians were skeptical, because two textile cooperatives already existed in Huancayo, and it was feared that the SAIS factory, would displace these cooperatives. Gradually, in late 1974, a compromise was reached: instead of the textile factory, the SAIS would develop a meat butchery and commercialization facility, to serve the growing Huancayo market; apparently no such facility existed in the area.

The negotiations with regard to commercialization reveal the increasing role of SAIS members in important economic policy-making. They began to debate with technicians, and approved more productive investments. In March, 1974, plans for new stables, bridges, and sheep-baths were in the process of development. Several irrigation projects were under consideration. The General Assembly voted approval of the purchase of two small tractors for the communities. The most significant investment, however, had been planned several years before by government personnel: the construction of a vast irrigation canal for one ex-hacienda and surrounding communities. Including a stable, trout hatchery, and animal reproductive studs, the total cost of the project is estimated at 300 million soles, the largest investment for agrarian cooperatives in Peru, to be financed by the World Bank and the Agrarian Bank in Peru. It is expected that the canal will double meat production and increase milk production twenty times in the locality.

3. The Elite and the Base in SAIS Cahuide

To a large extent, SAIS Cahuide has been resolving the conflicts between its constituent groups. Simultaneously, however, a new split began to emerge, between the better educated and more prosperous members of each site, and the others — between the elite and the base. This section will explore how the SAIS has tended to encourage this division, and how it might be mitigated in the future.

Base members in all sites want to be represented by capable, educated men who will be able to negotiate on their behalf with the technicians and government officials. Although the base recognizes that these men often gained the resources for their education by exploitation in their own community, the base tends to feel it has no other choice. Thus, almost every SAIS delegate is more prosperous than average; most members of the Administrative Council enjoy some secondary education, a very rare attribute in these isolated highlands peasant communities. In the ex-haciendas' CS, from 1971—1974, roughly 50% of the Council members were white-collar employees or low-level technicians (such as accountants).

With their superior education, the Administrative Council can dominate the other, somewhat more representative SAIS organs. Prior to General Assemblies, the Administrative Council meets (frequently with technicians as well) to develop a consensus on policy initiatives and decide how to present them most effectively. The Council President in Cahuide tends to be the most active Assembly participant,

speaking roughly one third of the time. If a Council initiative is threatened by rejection, the President can often point to a minor stipulation in the complex Agrarian Reform Law to bolster his position. Especially in such a situation, the Council may look to the technicians for prestigious confirmations of their argument.

The Cahuide Administrative Council has carefully failed to stimulate the activities of other SAIS Councils and committees. The vast distances of Cahuide also discourage the activities of these organs, because each Huancayo meeting may require two days of travel for some participants. The Vigilance Council has been weak. Although other SAIS have developed several special committees, such as Commercialization Committees, in Cahuide only the Education Committee has functioned, and even that only sporadically.

At times, Council members have used their political position to their own advantage. From Table 5, it is evident that the economic benefits of Council membership are substantial. Some members have also stalled as much as possible in the implementation of the key reforms of the Peasant Community Law. By this law, land ownership in the communities is to be equalized, and peasants whose major income source derives from outside the community are to be disqualified from membership. Both regulations threaten the position of the community elites.

The greatest political and economic benefits of Cahuide thus appear to be concentrated among a relatively small group of independent peasants, increasingly allied with receptive technicians and a few workers' leaders. The Council leaders realize that their fate is inexorably tied to the technicians. The knowledge and authority of the technicians are critical to the effective presentation of important SAIS investment proposals before government officials, as well as of SAIS policies before the General Assembly. Many Council members are tempted to offer promotions to the technicians in exchange for support for their leadership candidacy or for a future job after their two years in the Council. Given the great leverage of the Council over positions in the SAIS, it can easily try to co-opt a workers' leader by offering him a lucrative position — at a distant ex-hacienda where he will not be able to agitate politically.

In contrast to the era prior to the SAIS, however, the base is not impotent before this elite. Each community member and each General Assembly delegate has his vote at meetings that by law must be called. Members are organizing together to demand accountability from their leadership. In one of the two SAIS communities studied in detail, the base effectively recalled a disliked leader. In one of the ex-haciendas, the workers successfully organized to prevent their leader from accepting a promotion to another site by the SAIS. The General Assembly has blocked some Council initiatives, such as raises for the technicians. Indeed, the base often appears too suspicious of its leadership, frequently failing to understand the needs of the enterprise as a whole and why, for example, salary increases might be necessary.

The key to the resolution of the conflict between the elite and the base seems to be the assumption by the base of authority positions.²⁸⁾ Through participation in a Commercialization Committee or an Education Committee, a typical member can gain a more realistic appreciation of the SAIS. He might also find that the election of the most highly education men to the Council is not so critical, and begin to choose more representative candidates.

SAIS CAHUIDE: THE EXTENSION OF THE INCORPORATIVE PRINCIPLE TO OTHER OUTSIDER GROUPS

The Peruvian SAIS is one effort to extend the benefits of the cooperative enterprise to a group that under usual circumstances would remain beyond the cooperative. Perhaps the most significant test of the effectiveness of the SAIS is its capacity to inhibit the development of capitalist motivations in its members and to encourage the extension of concern to other groups still outside the enterprise. Did as much »group egoism« arise in the Peruvian SAIS as in its CAP's?

To a large extent, it is still too early to answer this question. Key evidence would derive from Cahuide's response to the establishment of the wider re-distributive enterprises, the PIAR, and of the more inclusive political organizations, the Agrarian Leagues, neither of which had been broached to any extent in the Huancayo area by March, 1974. However, I tentatively suggest that SAIS Cahuide has been more responsive to the needs of outsiders than the average coastal CAP. For example, we have noted that the SAIS finally decided against investing in a textile factory because their factory would displace other textile cooperatives in the area. Subsequently, Cahuide agreed to an arrangement for wool sale and commercialization with these cooperatives that is apparently designed to benefit both parties. In 1973, a new, hygienic milk plant was inaugurated near Huancayo, and the SAIS generously contributed virtually all its milk for the plant; some workers resented the reduction in their milk supply, however. The workers' union in Cahuide was concerned to improve the lot of the temporary workers in the ex-haciendas, a very rare concern of a permanent workers' union in Peru.

The greater sympathy with poorer outsiders in SAIS Cahuide than in most CAP is also suggested by 1973—74 survey data.²⁹⁾ For example, asked whether they would support a candidate who would put all his efforts into improving things in the site, because the site is still poor, or a candidate who would sacrifice a bit of the site's wealth for poor areas nearby, 35% of the respondents in the SAIS ex-hacienda selected the candidate who would sacrifice, in contrast to

²⁸⁾ This recommendation is also made by J. Elias Minaya, »Hacia una Metodología de Capacitación en Empresas Campesinas de Autogestión«, Ministry of Agriculture, Agrarian Zone III, Trujillo, Peru, 1974.

²⁹⁾ For a description of the data, see McClintock, »The Impact of Agrarian Cooperatives on Members' Attitudes and Behavior in Peru,« *op. cit.*, Chapter 3.

only 10% in two coastal CAP. Further, roughly 50% of the ex-hacienda respondents felt that everyone in a place should receive the same income, because all work is hard, rather than different incomes because of different skill levels — in comparison with only about 25% in the CAP. However, with regard to questions about support for hypothetical strikes of temporary workers and of near-by miners, the responses in the SAIS were similar to those in the CAP, with roughly 50% indicating they would try to help the strikers.

CONCLUSION

To the extent that the SAIS Cahuide experience is representative and is maintained, its incorporative principle points towards a solution to the problem of outsider groups in the cooperative system of an agrarian society. SAIS Cahuide seems to have effectively integrated original enterprise workers with a poorer, outside group. Although during the first years of the enterprise, conflict between the two parties may be severe, gradually both may realize the greater significance of wider issues and may eventually unite around these issues. Further, in SAIS Cahuide, the incorporative principle behind the enterprise seems to have encouraged its sympathetic application towards other outsiders, although not very greatly. Also important, the SAIS has effectively re-distributed power and wealth from ex-owners and technicians to poorer workers and peasant communities. Over 80% of the SAIS community respondents felt that the SAIS had helped their site at least somewhat.³⁰⁾ The new political and economic benefits tend to be concentrated, however, among the peasant community leadership, who are not very representative of their base. Further, it must be remembered that the SAIS still excludes vast numbers of poor peasant communities.

(Rad primljen maja 1975.)

APPENDIX 1

Figures on the advance of the agrarian reform are carefully assembled in Peru. The pamphlet »Reforma Agraria en Cifras,« published periodically by the »Direccion General de Reform Agraria y Asentamiento Rural« in Lima provides the basic data. In interpreting figures in these pamphlets, I have often excluded the »restructured« peasant communities from calculations, because they typically receive no land, only »benefitting« from political reforms. Individuals who have won land usually did so under the Belaunde law; they are included as »beneficiaries« of the reforms but not as »members of the cooperative sector.«

³⁰⁾ *Idem.*

Calculation of the significance of the reform in terms of the total number of hectares or families in Peru is much more difficult. In a poor nation where agrarian families are dispersed and many rural areas are isolated, data-gathering is arduous. Figures thus vary. I have tried to use the data that appears most reliable. The figure for the total number of rural families is reported in the *Boletín de Estadística Peruana 1964*, Centro de Documentación, Lima, 1967. The »Dirección General de Reforma Agraria y Asentamiento Rural« of the Ministry of Agriculture provided the figures for landless workers, small and medium farmers, and reform beneficiaries. Some scholars (H. Van de Wetering in the Wisconsin Land Tenure Center publications, 1973) cite the number of landless workers as smaller. The number expropriable hectares (roughly, farms over 150 has.) derive from the 1961 census, reported in Solon Barraclough, *Agrarian Structure in Latin America*, Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1973, esp. p. 252, and *Plan Nacional de Desarrollo*, Vol. 2: *Plan Agropecuario, 1971—1975*, Ministry of Agriculture, Lima, 1970, Table 58.

Calculation of the total usable land base is most difficult. Many small farmers have never reported their holdings, especially if they were in peasant communities; in 1974, I heard many discussions among farmers about whether or not they should »declare« their land. Because most had never »declared,« the number of small farms, and implicitly, the total amount of land, is seriously under-reported by Barraclough, op. cit. In contrast, a very high figure (29,667,000 has.) is reported by H. Van de Wetering, »The Current State of Land Reform in Peru,« Land Tenure Center Newsletter (April—June, 1973), but no source is given. Ultimately, I selected the figure provided in »Macro Institucional de la Reforma Agraria Peruana,« *Seminario Latinoamericano de Reforma Agraria y Colonización*, Chiclayo, Peru, 1971, p. 2.

Data on Chile derive from research of Van Whiting, Ph. D. Candidat at Harvard University, who explored CORA and ICIRA documents in Chile.

UČESĆE NEČLANOVA U DOBITI POLJOPRIVREDNIH ZADRUGA U PERUU: POLITIČKE I EKONOMSKE IMPLIKACIJE »POLJOPRIVREDNOG DRUŠTVA ZA DRUŠTVENI INTERES — CAHUIDE«

Cynthia McCLINTOCK

Re z i m e

Jedan od problema uvođenja sistema samoupravnih zadruga je usaglašavanje interesa radnika ovih zadruga sa interesima društva. Kao i prethodni kapitalistički vlasnici preduzeća, radnici u zadruzi koncentrišu svoju pažnju na povećanje dobiti i zanemaruju interes zajednice. Ovo zanemarivanje je naročito ozbiljno u siromašnim po-

ljoprivrednim zemljama u kojima stalni radnici bilo kog preduzeća, čak i radnici tradicionalnih, patrijarhalnih hacijenda, žive bolje od seljaka koji su izolovani od njih. U Peruu, na primer, skoro polovina poljoprivrednog stanovništva (oko četvrtine celokupnog stanovništva) živi na granici egzistencije u malim rasturenim seoskim zajednicama.

Da bi se ublažilo stanje ovih seljaka, u Peruu je stvoreno »Poljoprivredno društvo za društveni interes«. Ovo društvo ujedinjuje bivše radnike na hacijendama i siromašnije samostalne seoske zajednice. S obzirom da su hacijende pre nekoliko decenija uzurpirale zemlju seoskih zajednica, smatra se da ove zajednice imaju pravo na zemlju bivših hacijenda. Postoji nada da će Poljoprivredno društvo eliminisati dugogodišnje rivalstvo između radnika na hacijendama i slobodnih seljaka. Društvo nastoji da poveća prinose i da izjednači njihovu raspodelu među tehničkim kadrovima, radnicima i seljacima, time što seljacima daje veliki deo profita koji je ranije pripadao vlasnicima hacijenda (seljaci učestvuju u raspodeli profita ali ne rade u preduzeću; njihove zajednice i dalje ostaju odvojene od bivše hacijende). Društvo nastoji da svojim članovima delegira političku moć; seljaci praktično dominiraju Upravnim odborom — radnim telom koje formira politiku Društva uz pomoć stručnih lica, i Generalnom skupštinom koja predstavlja najviše telo društva i ima zadatak da odobrava ili odbacuje predloge Odbora. Upravni odbor je zadužen i za zapošljavanje i otpuštanje tehničkog personala.

Društvo je, međutim, samo otpočelo sa rešavanjem problema siromašnijih nečlanova u Peruu; mada je u toku poslednjih pet godina vladavine vojnih vlasti agrarna reforma ubrzana, do početka 1975. godine samo 15 procenata od ukupnog broja seoskih porodica bilo je obuhvaćeno poljoprivrednim zadrugama; od ovoga, 20 procenata je učlanjeno u društvo. Broj seljačkih porodica koje žele da stupe u društvo je znatno veći nego što ovo može da primi. Teoretski, uslov za prijem su siromaštvo i tradicija konflikata sa bivšom hacijendom. Stvarni uslovi su, međutim, mnogo kompleksniji; prijedom u društvo u stvari manipuliše nekoliko relativno razvijenijih zajednica, mada su, u proseku, članovi društva siromašniji od nečlanova.

Da bi ocenili efektivnost društva kao integralne kooperacije, analiziramo stanje u društvu Cahuide, koje predstavlja veliko, značajno ovčarsko preduzeće u centralnoj visiji Perua, sa dugom tradicijom ozbiljnih konflikata između seoskih zajednica i bivših hacijenda. Društvo je osnovano u početku 1971. godine i obuhvata 7 bivših hacijenda i 29 seoskih zajednica sa ukupno 3.772 porodice i preko 230.000 hektara zemlje.

U toku prvih dveju godina postojanja društva, od polovine 1971. godine do polovine 1973. godine, konflikti između pojedinih njegovih formacija bili su oštri. Seljaci su olako dobili kontrolu nad ključnim organima društva i iskoristili svoju političku moć da bi otpustili veliki broj stručnjaka (mada su, mora se priznati, ovi bili grubi prema seljacima), da bi smanjili plate preostalom stručnom kadru i povlastice u naturi radnicima na zemljištu bivših hacijenda. Revoltirani, mnogi

radnici organizovali su savez protiv društva, tražeći veće plate i preteći štrajkom.

Do polovine 1973. godine, međutim, seljaci su se, izgleda, osvetili za svoja minula stradanja i postali sigurniji. Negativni efekti konflikata sa bivšim radnicima na hacijendama i sa stručnim osobljem pokazali su im da njihovi interesi ne leže u konfliktima sa drugim formacijama društva već u zajedničkoj borbi za više ciljeve. Uvideli su da bez većih investicija društvo ne može da poboljša ekonomsko stanje bivše hacijende, koje je, uostalom, bilo prilično dobro. Osim toga, postalo je jasno da postojeći nivo profita, uprkos smanjenja plata, neće biti dovoljan da preobrazi 29 seljačkih zajednica u toku nekoliko godina. Zato su seoski rukovodioci formulisali nove zahteve za društvo u celini: više investicija, bolji plasman i neplaćanje poljoprivrednih dugova. Budući da su vlasti predusretljivije kad se radi o jedinstvenom frontu političkog pritiska, seljaci su zatražili saradnju stručnjaka i radnika.

Međutim, uprkos pomirenju sa stručnjacima i radnicima, društvo je uspelo da izvrši redistribuciju bogatstva i moći u prilog seljačkih zajednica, a na štetu stručnjaka i radnika. Seljaci dobijaju oko 15% od ukupnog dohotka društva. Eliminirane su velike disproporcije u primanjima različitih grupa radnika; svi radnici dobijaju otprilike isto onoliko koliko je ranije dobijalo samo 30% najbolje plaćenih radnika. Dok je u 1969. godini vrhunski stručnjak dobijao oko 12 puta više od prosečnog radnika, u 1974. godini on dobija samo oko 6 puta više od njega. Seljaci su dobili veliku političku moć; radnici su slobodni da se organizuju i tako postepeno dobijaju prava da donose odluke; stručnjaci su zadržali svoja prava s obzirom na to da raspoložu znanjem i da imaju pristup vladinim organima, ali oni treba da podnose račune seoskim rukovodiocima. Međutim, u toku 1973—1974., u procesu ujedinjavanja seoskih rukovodilaca sa stručnjacima i radničkim vođama, počela je da se formira grupa rukovodilačke elite; s obzirom da raspolaze ekonomskim i stručnim resursima, ova nova elita preuzimanjem dominacije nad društvom.

Najprimetniji znak uspeha društva kao integrisanog preduzeća je njegova sposobnost da razvije duh kapitalističke motivisanosti kod svojih članova i da da podsticaj za pružanje pomoći grupacijama koje su još uvek van društva. Zbog »mladosti« Cahuide, naše ocene mogu biti preuranjene, ali izgleda da je ovo društvo nešto više predusretljivo prema siromašnijim nečlanovima nego prosečna zadruga. Politika društva prema okolnim tekstilnim fabrikama i jednoj mlekari, koja je upravo osnovana, kao i odgovori na anketu sprovedenu 1973. svedoče o ovoj predusretljivosti.