

Kada je učinjen pokušaj da se oceni mogućnost sprovođenja glavnih predloga koji bi doveli do radikalne i efikasne industrijske demokratije, ustanovljeno je da komplet predloga koje zastupa »većina« predstavlja mnogo skladniju i izvodljiviju celinu. Bilo je, međutim, nekih značajnih aspekata u kojima su se predlozi »većine« pokazali manje logički dosledni i oni ne bi doveli do značajnijih poboljšanja u industrijskim odnosima, kao što je to u početku izgledalo. Takođe se dovodi u pitanje predviđena usklađujuća uloga nezavisnih članova odbora, kao i navodna privlačnost predloga za većinu radnika. Isto tako se dovodi u sumnju i ekonomska korist, za koju se tvrdi da će pratiti sprovođenje pomenutih predloga. Nedostatak jasno definisanog cilja u kompanijama koje bi se rekonstituisale na osnovu Bullockove većine, kao i odredbe kojim bi se obezbedilo učestvovanje radnika u ostatku dohotka i njihovog učešća u kontroli upravljanja, podupire mišljenje da je »većina« možda pokazala isuviše optimizma kako u pogledu izvodljivosti svojih predloga tako i u pogledu očekivanih koristi koje bi proizašle u oblasti industrijskih odnosa i ekonomske efikasnosti. Izveštaj »manjine« ocenjen je kao neefikasan; ukoliko bi i došlo do njegove realizacije, on verovatno ne bi doneo neke značajnije promene.

Zatim se razmatraju neke implikacije usvajanja predloga »većine«. U kompanijama u kojima bi se radnici odlučili da lansiraju ove predloge najzapaženiji institucionalni efekat bio bi u podsticanju komiteta radničkih poverenika i formiranju komiteta zajedničkih predstavnika (JRC), čime bi se na nivou kompanija popunila praznina u sadašnjoj strukturi kolektivnog pregovaranja. Posmatrano u jednom kratkoročnom periodu, ovo proširenje obima i dosega uticaja radnika u odlučivanju, preko predstavnika radnika u upravnim odborima i osniavanjem komiteta zajedničkih predstavnika, ojačalo bi postojeći mehanizam kolektivnog pregovaranja u kompanijama koje imaju više pogona. Međutim, dosta je nejasno kakve bi bile dugoročnije implikacije pomenutih događaja na nivou kompanija na sadašnje stanje kolektivnog pregovaranja. Dalje se tvrdi, da bi ovi predlozi verovatno uticali i na povećanje broja članstva u sindikalnim organizacijama (što bi posebno koristilo sindikatima službenika), te da bi delovali kao katalizatori na smanjenje broja sindikalnih unija putem fuzionisanja. Veruje se da bi istraživanja u brodogradilištu Harland and Wolf i novim radničkim kooperativama u Kirkby-u i Meriden-u doprinela rasvetljavanju i boljem razumevanju problema, sa kojima se mogu suočiti kompanije koje budu rekonstituisane na osnovu Bullockovog izveštaja većine.

U završnom delu ukratko se ocenjuju izgledi donošenja zakona u toj oblasti. U sadašnjim političkim okolnostima nema mnogo izgleda za radikalne promene putem donošenja zakona koji bi se zasnivali na izveštaju »većine«. Izvesne promene mogle bi da nastupe tek nakon nekoliko godina, a verovatno ne pre 1979. godine. Međutim, iako ne bude došao zakon koji se odnosi na privatni sektor, to ne isključuje mogućnost eksperimentisanja u odabranim nacionalizovanim industrijama, u kojima postoje radnik-direktor projekti koji u velikoj meri liče na predloge »većine«. U međuvremenu su u tom smislu usvojeni predlozi u PTT službi.

ISTORIJA SAMOUPRAVLJANJA HISTORY OF SELF-MANAGEMENT

FIRST ATTEMPTS TOWARDS THE INTRODUCTION OF A SELF-MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

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It is little-known that Czechoslovakia was the first European country to carry out self-management reforms. That was in the period 1945—1948.

The scope of the self-management system — both as accomplished and, more especially, as planned — was by no means inconsiderable. The events of February 1948, however, cut short those promising beginnings and forced Czechoslovakia to adopt the Soviet model.

1. PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS

It was not fortuitous that self-management found fertile soil in Czechoslovakia; it was here, above all, that particularly favourable conditions were present:

— Czechoslovakia was one of the victor states of World War II; this meant that all foreign armies abandoned its territory soon after the conclusion of the war so that its sovereignty, though not complete, was relatively far-reaching.

— alongside Eastern Germany — which was then destroyed by the war — Czechoslovakia was the most highly-developed industrial country in Eastern Europe**) and therefore had the educated working class which is such an important prerequisite of successful self-management.

— unlike the other countries in its sphere, Czechoslovakia had a democratic parliamentary system until 1939 and, thanks chiefly to the influence of T.G. Masaryk, profound democratic traditions which likewise created a favourable atmosphere for further democratic development.

— unlike the other countries in the Soviet sphere, an agreement had been concluded, even before the end of the war, between Beneš's Czechoslovak government-in-exile in the West and the Communist emigré

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**) Czechoslovakia with a population of 14 million accounted for 1.6 per cent of the world's industrial production.

group in Moscow under Gottwald's leadership. These two groups agreed on what came to be known as the Košice government programme, a certain compromise defining a number of democratic and socialist demands, more especially

- political pluralism,
- the partial nationalization of industry and other branches of the economy,
- introduction of state-wide economic planning,
- participation by the public in the management of the economy.

These demands therefore exhibited a certain consistency with regard to the conditions actually existing for the introduction of self-management. More so as the above-listed principles of the Košice programme differed considerably from the interpretation of analogous principles in Soviet terminology.

2. POLITICAL PLURALISM

This principle was understood to mean, at that time, an equal association of all political parties which had taken an active part in the liberation struggle and had not discredited themselves by collaboration with the Nazis. They included four parties in the Czech Lands (the Communists, the Social Democrats, the Czech Socialists and the People's Party — the last-named with a Christian-social programme), and in Slovakia the Communists (then already amalgamated with the Social Democrats), the Democratic Party and the Freedom Party.

The elections held on May 26, 1946, were a thoroughgoing application of the principle of political pluralism, the results were to be the basis for the representation of the political parties in the government and in the lower administrative bodies. The Communists came out as the strongest single party with 38 per cent of the votes cast. The Social Democrats gained 12 per cent and the Czech Socialists 18 per cent (Künstlinger, 1972, p. 59). It can therefore be said without exaggeration that the idea of a socialist development was accepted by the majority of the population. This result did not mean an imitation of what happened elsewhere; the Communist Party's election programme spoke of a specific so-called »Czechoslovak road to socialism«.

3. NATIONALIZATION

3.1. Principles

The nationalization of industry also differed from the Soviet concept. It was not meant to represent the liquidation of plant autonomy: the nationalized enterprises were to become independent corporations [legal entities] and to be run on the basis of »commercial entrepreneurial operation« (Decree 100/1945, Arts. 13 and 18). They were therefore intended to operate independently and to take their own decisions on minor-scale in-

vestment activity, with plant finances being strictly separated from the state budget. Moreover, the state was not entitled to interfere directly with plant policy and it was to be obliged to make up any losses that might be incurred.

3.2. Implementation

Nationalization embraced the whole range of mining, fuel and power, iron and steel, including rolling mills and smelting plants, as well as the armaments industry and the principal chemical enterprises. In the other branches of the economy, the criterion for nationalization was the number of employees — e.g., foundries (over 400), papermaking (over 300), metal-processing, electronics, precision engineering, optical and certain other plants (over 500), the porcelain industry (over 1500) (Decree 100, Art. 1). In addition, a number of enterprises in the foodstuffs industry (Decree 101), all banking corporations (Decree 102), and all private insurance institutions (Decree 103) were also nationalized.

This gave rise to what was known as the socialist sector which, in addition to the newly-nationalized plants, also included the former state-owned and local authority-owned enterprises. With the exception of property belonging to the German and the Hungarian states, and to persons of the German or Hungarian ethnic groups as well as to collaborators, the former owners were to be compensated; however, as a result of the events of February 1948, this was not accomplished (Hospodárské, 1974, p. 246).

The nationalization wave engulfed 16.4 per cent of all industrial enterprises with a capacity of 65 per cent and an employee total of 61.2 per cent; the last rose in the socialist sector to 80 per cent by 1947—48. Similarly, the turnover of this sector increased from 13,339 (first quarter of 1946) to 29,315 million Kčs in the second quarter of 1947, and thus developed more rapidly than the other non-socialist sectors, i.e., the private-capital sector (large and medium-sized enterprises) and the small-trade sector (craftsmen and small enterprises) whose turnover during the same period increased only from 14,416 to 21,186 million Kčs (Mrázek, 1966, p. 253; Urban, 1966, p. 267; Politická ekonomie, 1966, p. 352).

In the area of heavy industry, the prices were kept, by administrative order, at the level of 1946. That is why the nationalized sector appears to be smaller, in terms of turnover value, by comparison with light industry, than it does in terms of employee totals (Urban, 1966, 268).

4. PLANNING

4.1. Basic ideas

As on the subject of nationalization, there was also a general consensus about a planned guidance of the economy after the war, even though the inevitably *dirigiste* control during the war had produced an aversion to centralized intervention. In these circumstances, planning was conceived as a combination of centralized state measures and decentralized market-economy elements. This was motivated by the following considerations:

— the existence of a socialist sector would require state intervention, as was also the case in the Soviet Union;

— unwelcome experience associated with economic crises also led to the belief that a crisis-proof development could only be ensured by centralized planning measures;

— the need for society-wide planning would be acknowledged even in the countries of Western Europe, where, on the basis of socialist thinking, various attempts at planning were made after the end of the war (e.g., the Monet Plan);

— war damage, in the view of some experts, could be liquidated most rapidly by planned reconstruction;

— the principle of planned guidance, however, must not restrict the entrepreneurial independence of enterprises (Rozsypal, 1968, pp. 9—10).

It was on the basis of such arguments that the beginnings of a specific planning method, one that took account of Czechoslovak conditions, was beginning to take shape. This was based on the following concepts:

— respect for the multi-sector economic system with all consequences following therefrom — above all, preservation of the market mechanism since the private-capital sector was not subject to any mandatory directions from the state;

— efficiency-monitoring of the competing sectors by means of economic yardsticks, with the criterion of profitability high on the list;

— preservation of relatively numerous small centralized planning bodies, to be composed of representatives of different political trends and of additional experts. Neither should these central planning bodies develop into mammoth organizations (as usually happened in administratively directed systems) nor should »professional planners« predominate in them;

— the main weight of all planning — as far as possible — was to rest on the middle level (with the General Directorates);

— influence by the centralized level of planning was to come primarily from the industrial ministries and from other central interest-representing bodies (trade unions, industrial associations, etc. (Rozsypal, 1968, p. 11).

4.2. Institutional consolidation

The setting up of an Economic Council as a supporting body for the government was first envisaged in the Košice government programme; its definitive form was laid down in Decree 63/1945. It was intended to prepare the national economic plan and submit proposals for its implementation. Its members were the Premier (or his deputy) as its chairman, the nine economic ministers (Finance, Industry, Internal Trade, Foreign Trade, Agriculture, Food, Transport, Posts, Labour Protection and Social Welfare), as well as five representatives of governmental, political or economic summit organizations (trade unions, National Bank, Farmers Union, etc.) (Decree 63 Arts. 2; 3). For the discharge of its task, it had at its disposal a General Secretariat; its technical apparatus was to be a newly-constituted State Planning Office as well as two existing central bodies: the State Statistical Office, and the Supreme Price Authority (Decree 63, Arts. 5, 8).

A special commission of 24 leading industrial experts was to ensure direct participation in the planning process by representatives of the country's economic life (Fišer, 1965, pp. 30—31).

For the institutional shaping of the Czechoslovak planning bodies, as outlined above, the Soviet system was used as a model to only a limited extent. It possible that the concept of the General Secretariat as a »brain-trust« was based on American experience, since Roosevelt had created a similar institution in his planning staff. The possibility, on the other hand, that the French planning instrumentation was being adopted, has been denied, in spite of certain resemblances between the *Conseil du Plan* and the *Commissariat Général du Plan de Modernisation et Equipement* on the one hand and the Czechoslovak Economic Council and its General Secretariat on the other, since the Czechoslovak institutions predate the French (Fišer, 196, pp. 45—46).

In the course of the preparation of the First Plan, a new body was set up, the Central Planning Commission, because the Economic Council had not been successful. It was presumably the Communist Party which promoted the establishment of this new body because it had been inadequately represented on the Economic Council (Fišer, 1965, pp. 54—56).

The Central Planning Commission stemmed from a Special Commission and, taking account of the now-known election results, consisted of representatives of the different parties and of central institutions. In spite of the clash of different political opinions and of diverging theoretical concepts, discussions were entirely factual and decisions on all essential matters were always unanimous (Fišer, 1965, pp. 108—110).

Subordinated to the Central Planning Commission on the lower levels — all the way down to plant level — were similar planning commissions, so that it is possible to speak of real (if still imperfect) »planning democracy.«

5. SELF-MANAGEMENT

5.1. Basic ideas

The demand for popular participation in the management of the country's economy seemed to fit in harmoniously with the above principles and was regarded as a logical supplement and the ultimate achievement of economic democracy.

A peculiar aspect of the Czechoslovak concept of self-management was the fact that it was to make use of the existing institutional set-up. A special commission for the reorganization of economic self-management under the Economic Council consequently worked out the principles of legislation for an economic organization as »systems of economically and democratically administered national links«.

5.2. Principles of supra-plant self-management

The functioning of the Czechoslovak self-management bodies was envisaged as, on the one hand, direct and, on the other as »transferred.« The former was to be concerned with guarding the interests of all compo-

nents of economic operation, while the latter would consist of planning, guiding and controlling the branches of the economy by authorization from the ministries. (Kaplan, 1968, p. 233).

Unlike that of Yugoslavia, the Czechoslovak system of self-management was based, simultaneously, on plant and supra-plant levels. The latter was envisaged as structured both vertically and horizontally — in such a way that both components would form an organizational and institutional entity owing to the fact that the territorial links of the vertical system would be identical with the units of horizontal organizations, i.e., the sections of chambers of commerce. The horizontal elements were to have regional tasks — i.e., unite the various branches of the economy within a certain area, while the vertical ones were to be constructed according to subject-spheres with a state-wide range of activity. (Kaplan, 1968, p. 235).

It was envisaged at the time that the representatives in all self-management bodies would be elected — but a serious weakness of the concept as it then existed was the fact that, originally, only the entrepreneurs were to be elected to certain supra-plant bodies (such as the Czechoslovak Artisans' Union), while for the employees the so-called employees' organizations were reserved at plant level. Only after prolonged conflicts was a compromise solution reached whereby employees, too, had access to the majority of supra-plant self-management bodies.

It should be said that only some of the principles of supra-plant self-management were in fact put into effect. The principles were enshrined in draft legislation actually passed by the government — but the events of February 1948. prevented their realization.

5.3. Self-management on the plant level

The principles of intra-plant self-management, on the other hand, were firmly established in the early nationalization decrees of 1945, in particular in Decree 100/1945. on the nationalization of the mines and certain industrial enterprises; in Decree 104/1945 on factory and enterprise councils; and in Government Ordinance 6/1946 on the statute of industrial national enterprises.

Under these regulations the internal organization of national enterprises was somewhat similar to the management of a limited company. The highest body in the enterprise was the board, whose chairman was the director, appointed by the General Directorate in agreement with the trade union and other interest-representing organizations. His deputies were appointed in the same way; one of these had to be appointed from among the employees.

Two-thirds of the board were appointed by the central body after consultation with the provincial union of regional selfmanagement and the central interest-representing organization of the industry, and one-third was elected by the employees by direct ballot for a term of three years (Government Ordinance 6/1946 Arts. 4, 6). Under Article 8 of the same Ordinance, it was competent, among other things, to:

- discuss and approve the director's report,
- take decisions on the director's personal affairs insofar as they stemmed from his service relationship,
- grant and revoke procurations,
- take decisions on rewards to employees for exceptional performance.

A share in the management of national enterprises was, admittedly, also taken by the works councils which were elected only by the employees and whose authority had greatly increased as compared with the pre-war period.

Although under Decree 104/1945 Art. 2 they were not entitled to directly »interfere in the management or operation« of an enterprise, they nevertheless enjoyed extensive rights in many respects, such as:

- to champion and promote the economic, social and other interests of the working people,
- to ensure that the economic operation of the plant is in line with the common interest and the interest of its own employees,
- to share in the performance of the economic and social-political public administration,
- to share in decisions on hiring and on other matters concerning the employees (Arts. 20, 22).

To ensure that works councils were able to discharge their tasks effectively the plant management was obliged, under Decree 104/1945 Art. 27, to:

- hear the works council on all envisaged economic measures,
- make available to it any information it demanded,
- allow its representative to inspect the books,
- invite the works council to all negotiations and meetings of the plant management.

The works councils received 10 per cent of the planned profit and 30 per cent of above-plan profit for the social welfare needs of the employees (Government Ordinance 6/1946 Art. 21 and Decree 104/1945 Art. 24).

6. ECONOMIC RESULTS

To try to assess the economic results of that period in order to form an approximate judgement of its effectivity and hence of the viability of the elements of self-management is an immensely complex task. To begin with, this was a period of not quite three years: its brevity alone forbids far-reaching conclusions. Moreover, this was a period of post-war reconstruction, when relatively rapid growth and other successes would probably have been achieved under any system of management.

In spite of these reservations, we shall quote a few figures about Czechoslovakia's economic development during that period. The figures come from various sources to ensure the highest possible measure of reliability. Moreover, we shall try to compare certain data with indicators from other countries which, with the exception of France and Britain, had similar conditions as to population and territory, even if in some instances (Austria) the extent of war damage was much greater.

6.1. Some indicators of economic development

Table 1:
Percentage distribution of national income 1946—48

	1946 (estimated)	1947	1948
Consumption	96.7	91.8	84.8
Accumulation	3.3	8.2	15.2

(Source: Průběh plnění dvouletého plánu 1947—48, Prague 1949, p. 309)

Table 2:
Development of the real gross national product in stable Kčs 1946—48

	1946	1947	1948
in million Kčs (as of 1948)	43,815	52,996	55,343
in indices (1948=100)	79.2	95.7	100

(Source: Pešek, B.P.: Gross National Product of Czechoslovakia in Monetary and Real Terms 1946—58, Chicago 1965, p. 44)

Table 3: Consumer purchases 1946—1950 in stable prices (in million Kčs as of 1948)

1946	29,601
1947	37,269
1948	36,513

(Source: Pešek, B.P. Gross National Product of Czechoslovakia in Monetary and Real Terms 1946—58, Chicago 1965, p. 44)

Table 4: Development of net incomes 1946—48 in indices (1946=100)

1946	1947	1948
100.0	115.3	128.3

(Source: According to data in Průběh plnění dvouletého plánu 1947—48, Prague 1949, compiled in Hospodářské dějiny Československa v 19. a 20. století, Prague 1974).

6.2. Social Attainments

We must not overlook the social achievements attained during the period from 1945 to 1948 since in this field Czechoslovakia outstripped even countries with greater resources at their disposal for social expenditure (Stručný, 1969, p. 386).

Thus, in the area of wage policy, the lowest incomes of unskilled workers were greatly increased so that by 1948 their real incomes were higher, in absolute terms, than in the most favourable pre-war year. The middle strata and the skilled workers did not reach their pre-war levels until later (Stručný, 1969, p. 383).

These measures resulted, between 1945 and 1948, in an approximation of the incomes of manual and white-collar workers. (Whereas in 1939 the average salary of a private white-collar worker was 1962 per cent higher than the average wage of a manual worker, this gap had narrowed to 45 per cent by 1946 and further to 30—37 per cent by 1948 (Stručný, 1969, p. 380).

In the field of old-age pensions measures were also taken which led to an increase of the lowest pensions and thus to an approximation between the different social strata. These were

- an increase in the old-age pensions of manual workers,
- the introduction of social welfare benefits for the socially-underprivileged or those incapable of work,
- assimilation of the different old-age pension categories.

Whereas in 1937 the old-age pensions of private white-collar workers exceeded those of manual workers by a factor of 5.5, and whereas those of employees in the public service exceeded those of manual workers by a factor of 10, this gap by 1948 had narrowed down to 1.3 for private white-collar workers, and to 1.5 for employees and officials in the public service (Hospodářské, 1974, p. 286).

The data listed above combined to result in a rise in living standards and a simultaneous narrowing of the gap between different groups of the population.

If we include social consumption (= the satisfaction of social needs from what are known as social funds, e.g. the education and health services) we find — related to 1937 — an increase in total consumption (= individual + social consumption) of 8 per cent (Plnění, 1949, p. 310). These results seem significant in light of the considerably more rapid growth in the share accumulation of the national income (cf. Table 1). What needs emphasizing is the tendency towards a *justified* assimilation of the incomes of different groups of the population; this may be regarded as evidence of a socialist social-welfare policy.

6.3. Czechoslovakia as compared with other countries

Table 5: Development of national income in selected European countries, 1936—1958

Development indices in stable prices; per-capita figures in brackets							
Year	*Czechoslovakia	Netherlands	Denmark	Finland	France	Switzerland	Belgium
1936—38	—	—	—	—	—	—	100
1937	100	—	—	—	—	—	—
1938	—	100	100	100	100	100	—
1948	97 (113)	115 (102)	116 (105)	111 (103)	103 (103)	121 151	100 (—)

*) for Czechoslovakia: national income according to the material product definition.

Sources: Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, 1952, UN, New York, June 1952, pp. XI, XII.

Baudhuin, F.: Histoire Économique de la Belgique 1945—1956, Brussels 1958, p. 370.

Hospodářské dějiny Československa v 19. a 20. století, Prague 1974, p. 280.

Table 6: Industrial production indices in various European countries for the year 1948 (1937=100)

Czechoslovakia	Belgium	France	Netherlands	Austria	Hungary.	Britain
103.3*	93	102	114	78	134**	109

* per capita: 121.0 (The marked discrepancy between the volume of production and per-capita production is connected with the population decrease due to the expulsion of the Germans.)

** 1937—38 = 100

Sources: Statistical Yearbook 1948, United Nations, New York 1949, pp. 118—127.

Stručný hospodářský vývoj Československa do roku 1955, Prague 1969, p. 368.

Table 7: Indices of real gross national product and its components in Czechoslovakia and Austria for the year 1948 (1937=100)

	Total GNP	GNP per capita	individual consumption
Czechoslovakia	101.7	106.9	100.9
Austria	90.2	87.6	83.8

Source: Krejčí, J.: Volkseinkommenvergleich Österreich — ČSSR, Vienna, no year

6.4. Interpretation

In spite of the difficulties mentioned above and the need for caution in interpreting all listed data, it seems nevertheless possible to conclude, at the least, that Czechoslovakia's economic development during the period from 1945 to 1948 may be described as favourable and that the system at

that time, including its self-management elements, stood up well in international competition. Its indices are in no way less favourable than those of Western countries, whereas after 1948 there was a marked lagging behind the West in many spheres, e.g., by comparison with Austria (Kosta-Kramer-Slama: Der technologische Fortschritt in Österreich und in der Tschechoslowakei, Vienna 1971).

7. CONCLUSIONS

(a) The 1945—48 period, sometimes referred to in Czech literature on the subject as the period of «economic democracy», Kaplan, 1967, p. 5), emerges as exceptionally significant from the point of view of the theory and practice of economic self-management and its unjust neglect. It represented the first, however imperfect, attempt to introduce self-management on a major scale in Eastern Europe, and moreover on several levels simultaneously, and to integrate it with the other elements of the then-emerging democratic-socialist system. This concept was also — especially in the beginning — supported by a considerable part of the population.

(b) Czechoslovak «economic democracy» did not emerge on the basis of an unfavourable experience of the bureaucratic elements of an etatist system but, on the contrary, was conceived as a positive socialist programme in which elements of self-management were to play an important part.

(c) We must not, on the other hand, overlook the fact that the efforts to combine planning and market elements did not stem from an integrated theoretical concept of a synthesis of centralistic principles and decentralized elements, as developed later, for instance, by Wł. Brus (Ogólne problemy funkcjonowania gospodarki socjalistycznej, Warsaw 1961). Those efforts then sprang largely from pragmatic considerations based on the coexistence at that time of such heterogeneous elements as the state sector and the private-capital sector, and the obvious need for heterogeneous methods of guidance. Another factor, clearly, was also the divergent views of the different political parties on the specific character of socialism, its economic structure, and appropriate methods of economic direction.

(d) In addition, the principle of economic self-management was by no means consistently seen as the exclusive right of direct producers to dispose freely of the means of production but rather — especially on the supra-plant level — as an instrument for articulating the interests of heterogeneous subjects (including entrepreneurs vis-à-vis the power of the state machine. The principle of self-management was not thoroughly implemented even on plant level but represented a certain combination of self-management and technocratic elements.

(e) In spite of these shortcomings, and considering the low state of socialist economic theory, the absence of any theoretical self-management conception at the time and the lack of practical experience in socialist economic management, the period of Czechoslovakia's «economic democracy» may be regarded as the first attempt to establish a socialist system of a kind that would match the economic maturity and the democratic traditions of an industrially-advanced Czechoslovakia. In this context, the

self-management element played a significant part and fitted organically into this concept.

(F) The period described may, in a sense, be regarded as an anticipation of what has come to be known as the Prague Spring which — though on a higher theoretical level and on the strength of a greater wealth of practical experience — likewise strove for a combination of non-directive (outline) planning, a regulated market mechanism, and the principle of workers' self-management.

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PRVI POKUSAJ UVOĐENJA ŠAMOUPRAVLJANJA
U ČEHOSLOVAČKOJ

Jan OSERS

Rezim e

Autor smatra da su u Čehoslovačkoj u periodu između 1945. i 1948. godine prvi put u Istočnoj Evropi učinjeni pokušaji uvođenja samoupravljanja. Čehoslovačka je u poređenju sa ostalim istočnoevropskim zemljama imala najpovoljnije preduslove: ona je još pre rata bila industrijski razvijena zemlja, a njena privredna osnova u toku rata bila je relativno malo razorena; osim toga u Čehoslovačkoj je postojala demokratska tradicija, tako da se uvođenje određenih elemenata samoupravljanja (u stvari tu se radilo više o samoodlučivanju nego o samoupravljanju) može interpretirati kao proširenje demokratije i na privrednu oblast.

Ostvarivanje participacije stanovništva u upravljanju privredom zamišljeno: je 1) kao učešće u upravljanju na nivou preduzeća, i 2) kao učešće u upravljanju na višim nivoima. Ovo drugo trebalo je da se realizuje u okviru vertikalno povezanih granskih organa kao i horizontalno organizovanih regionalnih jedinica. Pri tome bilo je predviđeno međusobno povezivanje oba ova sistema, na taj način što bi niže jedinice vertikalnih organa saradivale sa stručnim organima horizontalnih organizacija.

Organi samoupravljanja na svim nivoima trebalo je da budu birani (ne imenovani), pri čemu samoupravljanje van (iznad) preduzeća nije shvaćeno kao čisto radničko samoupravljanje, s obzirom da je dozvoljena mogućnost da i preduzetnici budu pozvani da učestvuju u radu ovih organa.

Principi samoupravljanja na nivou preduzeća zakonski su regulisani istovremeno sa nacionalizacijom industrijskih preduzeća (1945. i 1946. godine). Najviši organ rukovođenja u preduzeću bio je Odbor, čiji predsednik je bio direktor. Njega je, uz saglasnost sindikalne organizacije, imenovala generalna direkcija. Slične odredbe važile su i za njegove zameneke od kojih je jedan morao da potiče iz redova zaposlenih u preduzeću.

Dve trećine članova odbora su, uz saglasnost stalnog organa sindikata, imenovani, dok je jednu trećinu članova birao kolektiv neposredno i to za mandatni period od tri godine.

Sledeći samoupravni organ bio je Savet preduzeća, odnosno pogonski savet, koji je bio biran u celini od radnog kolektiva i koji je imao pravo iznošenja mišljenja o svim pitanjima koja se tiču zaposlenih radnika. Osim toga, on je raspolagao sa 10% dobiti, odnosno 30% ekstra dobiti koja se koristila za potrebe zajedničke potrošnje radnog kolektiva.

Sumarno posmatrano može se (što se ponekad u stručnoj literaturi i čini) period između 1945. i 1948. označiti terminom »industrijska demokratija« i oceniti kao, u Istočnoj Evropi prvi, iako nezavisan, pokušaj uvođenja principa samoupravljanja, i to istovremeno na više nivoa. Pri tome, treba istaći da je ovaj koncept počivao na pragmatističkom rezonovanju

i da nije imao nikakvu teorijsku osnovu, s obzirom da neposredno po završetku rata nije postojala niti razvijena teorija samoupravljanja niti neka teorijski fundirana alternativa sovjetskom modelu socijalizma. Takođe ovde se ni u kom slučaju ne može govoriti ni o jednom, konsekvntno sprovedenom, radničkom samoupravljanju, kakvo je tek kasnije ostvareno u Jugoslaviji.

THE ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OF
PRODUCER COOPERATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES,
1791—1939

Derek C. JONES*)

I. Introduction

Relatively little attention has been paid to the broad historical experience of American producer cooperatives (PCs).¹⁾ The principal exception to this neglect is a pioneering article by Shirom (1972)²⁾ which examines diverse issues relating to that experience and is mainly concerned with the period 1880—1935. The present paper is also general in scope and shares the conviction of Derber (1973: 598) that, so far as industrial democracy is concerned... a careful assessment of the past can provide a valuable guide to the future.« The essay falls into four parts. First, by building upon Shirom's statistical work, a statistical overview of the importance of PCs in the U.S. during 1791—1939 is given and the thesis that the American experience has comprised five waves is challenged. Separate summary data on important PC experiments such as the Minneapolis Cooperages and PCs in Massachusetts are given. The implications of this statistical overview for an understanding of the scope and limits of the producer cooperative (PC) sector and for the variation in the birth rate of American PCs are briefly examined. In a following section on doctrine, the main aim is to establish a relevant doctrine against which to evaluate the actual American experience. It will be argued that Shirom misleadingly represents and oversimplifies the true nature and origin of American doctrine on PCs. An alternative classification of American doctrine on PCs is developed which recognizes both home-grown and non-American influences ignored by Shirom. It

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¹⁾ The term is used in the sense employed by Shirom. A PC is an autonomous industrial enterprise where, because of worker ownership of equity, there is believed to be substantial provision for employee participation in decision-making at all levels in the enterprise. Shirom (1972: 534) regards PCs as examples of »total participation.«

²⁾ There have been several good studies of specific experiments, such as Virtue (1905, 1932, Minneapolis cooperages) and Janes (1924, shingle weaving). But Shirom's study is the first comprehensive overview.