

## WORKERS' SELF-MANAGEMENT IN POLAND

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For several years now, more precisely since 1980, Poland has been a popular subject abroad, and traces of this popularity can also be found in this journal. During the whole post-war period up to 1980, less books and papers were written about Poland than have been in the last few years. Their authors are usually Poles living abroad or foreigners, with often, alas, only a superficial knowledge of Polish realities. Scarce, on the other hand, are papers written by authors living and working daily in the Polish reality they describe. The present paper is intended to contribute, be it only a small degree, to bridging this gap.

Thus, it is intended to show what are — according to this author — the most important facts and problems from the history of workers' (employees') self-management in post-war Poland, with special consideration of the period after 1980. The choice of subject is not only motivated by the facts that this journal devotes special attention to this domain but also that it is presently one of the central concerns in Poland.

The author had wished to deal separately with the evolution of the theory and practice of self-management in Poland, but making this distinction proved in some cases to be impossible. This was particularly so in the stormy period of 1980—1981 when various political forces fought over self-management and its shape, and this process defined the whole of the then current theory and practice of self-management. It is only in the past 2—3 years that one can speak of the beginnings of true self-management and self-management theory.

The present paper comprises three parts, in which the consecutive periods, 1944—1980, August 1980—December 1981 and 1982—1985, are analysed.

*1944—1980*

Within this span of time there were a few short periods during which self-management was brought to life and the same number in

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which it went into long hibernation. The periods of liveliness took place at historical turning points, moments of political activity by society as a whole, and lack or weakness on the part of the central authorities, while periods of atrophy occurred at times of political stabilization, politically passive behaviour by society and with the presence of strong central power.<sup>1</sup>

The first signs of life come in the years 1944/45, when workers were taking over factories abandoned by the occupants or devoid of owners; they were rebuilding the plants with their own hands and putting them into production. This process found its legal reflection and sanction in the decree of 1945 on factory councils. The strengthening power of the central authorities and introduction of Stalinist methods of management of the economy and society led to the annihilation of these buds of workers' self-management.

A real eruption of the workers' self-management movement took place in 1956. It accompanied the violent stream of political events started in June 1956 by the strike of Poznan workers, which was put down in bloodshed, and terminated in October of that year by central power being taken over by a new group of people who enjoyed at the beginning a vast support from society. The spontaneous movement giving birth to new workers' councils was legalized in the law on workers' councils in November 1956. This law gave the workers' councils broad legal capacities, including appointment of the factory's director. This law was probably even more radical than the analogous Yugoslav law of 1950, which initiated the development of self-management in that country.

The new party and state authorities, however, treated workers' self-management with deep distrust. In principle, they did not have a vision or a goal towards which the nation could have been led. The philosophy adopted by the new government can be reduced to just a few simple precepts, such as ensuring the country's external safety, ensuring internal order, and not getting involved in risky economic projects. Such a philosophy did not leave sufficient margin for the radical transformation of social relations, including the creation and maintenance of employees' self-management. Taking advantage of a drop in social tension and in the political activity of the working class, the authorities introduced a new law on workers' committees in 1958, which severely limited the significance of workers' self-management. According to this law the workers' committee became just one, and in fact the least important one, of the three component parts of the so-called Workers' Self-Management Conference, the other two components being the trade union and party organizations.<sup>2</sup> This led to the downfall of the importance of self-management.

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<sup>1</sup> Some brief, but very much to the point, remarks on workers' self-management in Poland before 1980 are contained in B. Horvat: *The Political Economy of Socialism*, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., Armonk, New York 1982. (Yugoslav edition: *Politička ekonomija socijalizma*, Globus, Zagreb, 1984).

<sup>2</sup> A description of self-management after 1958 from the formally legal point of view is contained, for instance, in: M. Kabaj, S. Wróblewski:

A new stirring of the idea of workers' self-management took place after 1970, although on a much smaller scale than in 1956. Dramatic events in Gdansk were followed by a new change of the governing group, and, in a wave of criticism directed at the errors committed by the previous authorities, various concepts for the improvement of the country's socio-economic system were put forward. The new government chose to aim at speedy economic development of the country and improvement of the standard of living. The intended methods for carrying out these plans were investments, modernization of production assets and technologies, and improvement of skills. It must be admitted that such concepts were widely approved by the public. Problems emerged only afterwards, when declared goals were no longer being attained. These concepts did not leave much room for self-management. In general, self-management, whether for factory workers' or for inhabitants of a certain territory, or within a cooperative, was regarded as synonymous with dilettantism, and therefore opposed to the principle of proper professional skills.

From the formal legal point of view, workers' self-management preserved its continuity throughout the period 1958—1980. The self-managerial practice of this period would not however deserve any attention were it not for the fact that, in an important way, it shaped workers' attitude towards self-management, an attitude which was afterwards reflected in the significant period 1980—1981.

In 1958 the principle of one-man management triumphed again, at the expense of self-management which was additionally weakened by the creation of the Workers' Self-Management Conference, mentioned above. Power was very unequally distributed within the Conference: actual workers' self-management was the weakest partner, a weakness which resulted, for instance, from its subordination to the enterprise's trade union organization. It was the union that organized self-management committee elections, and rules issued by the central board of trade unions determined in a detailed way the manner in which self-management should proceed, the rights and duties of self-management activists, etc. In their turn, trade unions were unconditionally dominated by the party organization. Thus, within the power setting formed by such partners in the enterprise as the directors, the party organization, trade union and self-management committee — the last was the weakest one.

This weakness of self-management was one of the causes for the feeble interest that workers showed in this institution. (The feebleness had other, internal, causes as well). This made it easier for the stronger partners to manipulate the self-management process, by placing people trusted by and subordinate to the enterprise management in the self-management bodies, which led to total dependence of these bodies on the enterprise management and to their isolation from the

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»Workers' participation in management. A review of Polish experience«. In: »Social aspects of work organization: Implication for social policy and labour relations«. Research Series No. 33/1978, International Institute for Labour Studies. This paper also includes the English-language text of the law of 1958.

workers. The alienation of the latter from self-management deprived it of its natural basis, weakened its power and thereby made it even more dependent upon stronger partners, etc. This in turn led to the eventual atrophy of self-management, and to the transformation of positions within this institution into *sui generis syncerus*.

Such practices lasted long enough — over 20 years! — to influence workers' attitudes. From their point of view self-management was something alien and of small importance. Inimical and derisory attitudes towards particular self-management bodies was automatically transferred to the whole idea of self-management. Workers became deeply convinced that it had nothing to offer them, just like the trade unions, which were subject to the authorities. Under these circumstances, the idea of independent trade unions, organized after the image of the unions existing in capitalist countries, started to gain popularity among workers. This popularity was enhanced by observation of living conditions in Western countries and, surprisingly, by official propaganda, which explained the high living standard of workers in the West by the power enjoyed and used by their trade unions, which were able to force upon the employers high wages and social overheads. The situation therefore seemed ripe for the creation of strong independent trade unions through which the employer, i. e. the state, could be compelled to provide wage increases and higher social benefits. This reasoning was corroborated, in the workers' opinions, by existing practice. It repeatedly turned out that, after each period of workers' demonstrations and strikes, the authorities were able to find resources for wage increases, price decreases, etc. It sufficed only to press for them hard enough.<sup>3</sup>

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Along with the weakness in self-management practice there also went poor theoretical activity. The problems of self-management were pushed away into the distant peripheries of the domain of economists' interests: except in sporadic positive cases<sup>4</sup>, nothing essential was created. There were mostly narrowly oriented studies describing examples of employee participation in the West and modest practice of self-management practice in Poland.

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The history of workers' self-management in Poland up to 1980 shows how easily the self-management idea dies away in periods of political stability when it is not backed by politics and science, and

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<sup>3</sup> See J. Pajestka: *Kształtowanie procesu rozwoju, PWE, Warszawa 1983.*

<sup>4</sup> I primarily mean the publication by J. Balcerek: *Samorząd robotniczy a systemy społeczno-gospodarcze, Warszawa 1973.*

when it does not become a part of a positive concept for changing social relations.

*August 1980 — December 1981*

This very short period was extremely rich in important events, which is why it deserves separate treatment. It was also a period of frequent changes in the situation and the attitudes of the main actors in the drama. This changeability often left foreign researchers with false impressions, especially when they stayed only a short time in Poland and, seeing the situation at that particular moment, generalized their observations to encompass the whole period under question. Writing about this time is difficult just because of this intensity of change in events and situations, and also because of the emotions it arouses. It is quite easy to be accused of allying oneself with inimical forces (of the régime on the one hand or antisocialist instigations on the other).

The period under consideration started with mass strikes by workers which led to change in the personal composition of the central authorities, this time with no bloodshed, and to the creation of independent trade union organizations, primarily the "Solidarity" union.

Both in the attitudes of the striking workers and in the activities of "Solidarity" during the first few months of its existence the trade-unionist consciousness of workers came through very strongly. Any search for self-management-oriented postulates would be in vain, both among the famous 21 points of the workers striking in August 1980 in Gdańsk, and among the demands put forward during the numerous strikes of autumn 1980 and winter 1980/1981. The demands formulated were for the most part of a trade-unionist nature, concerning wage increases, shortening of working time, increase of social benefit funds, etc. They also addressed broader political questions such as the democratization of political life, i. e. the softening or abolition of censorship, the limitation or liquidation of the so-called "nomenclature", the limiting of privileges granted to people from the power elite, recognition of the pluralistic nature of the trade union movement, etc. Such political demands cannot be treated as constituting a push towards workers' self-management.

The idea of self-management was, in fact, brought into the light of day not by workers, but by intellectuals. Perspectives of social change were opening up at this time: plans of — primarily economic — reforms proliferated. These plans very often referred, and with quite strong emphasis, to the self-management idea. This idea also found its place in the economic reform concept elaborated for the government. According to this, self-management was to be one of the three "pillars" of the reform, together with independence for and self-financing of an enterprise. The concept was backed by the 9th Extraordinary Party Congress (PUWP), which took place in July 1981.

The newly-coined self-management idea encountered an almost unanimously negative reception among workers and the activists of the strongest trade union, "Solidarity". They all considered the crea-

tion of self-management as an attempt to transfer the burden of the crisis and the fight against it onto the workers' shoulders, while the whole responsibility for the crisis should in fact rest upon "Them" (i. e. the party, government, directors, administration, scientists, etc.). Besides this, workers and trade union activists considered the running of enterprises as none of the workers' business; it was instead the duty of managers who got paid for doing just that, and therefore workers' participation in management could only be a cost-free help to those managers. This type of participation was thus not treated by them as a possible opening in the direction of self-fulfilment, but rather as an additional unwanted duty, a "penalty" for harm not done. The negative attitude of trade union activists also resulted from another fear, namely, that the independence and self-management of enterprises and the lack of one supreme employer to whom demands could be addressed, could lead to a breakdown in the unity of the newly formed, consolidating and centralizing trade union. Both ordinary workers and trade union activists preferred the position of a demanding rather than co-managing and co-responsible side. As can be seen, "Solidarity" did not in that respect differ much from many Western trade unions, with their negative attitudes towards self-management.

A situation ensued which may seem paradoxical today to many people: the government, backed by some intellectuals, was at this moment for workers' self-management, while "Solidarity", supported by the majority of workers, was against it. This situation lasted until June 1981.

It was during this month that the situation underwent an important change. This occurred on the "Solidarity" side, mainly within its top level leadership, who radically reversed their attitudes and started, with the energy of the newly-converted, to fight for radical employee self-management and make it the main point of their positive programme.

The change of "Solidarity" 's attitude towards the self-management idea was so thorough and abrupt, as to make one wonder. There are two possible interpretations of this change. The first is that "Solidarity", or at least its activists, had matured politically and become ready to undertake the citizen's duty of co-responsibility for combating the national economic crisis. The second is that the "Solidarity" leadership saw the independence and self-management of enterprises as a way of taking over power. There is evidence to support both these interpretations.

That behind the first explanation is related to a "personality crisis" which "Solidarity" had experienced in the spring of 1981. The spontaneity and enthusiasm which had accompanied the birth and quick growth of this union had passed. The belief that it was sufficient to press the authorities hard enough to make them find money for everything was breaking down, and social support had likewise diminished. As a trade union, "Solidarity" had simultaneously attained everything and nothing. It had achieved wage increases and did not allow price increases, but market collapse had caused an incredible drop in living standards; it had succeeded in obtaining free Saturdays,

but time lost in the interminable queues saw to it that there was no more free time than before; it had fought for citizen's rights, but rationing had abolished the free choice of the consumer and even limited freedom of movement, as a result of the regional system of rationing, registration of rationing cards in shops, etc. There was an urgent necessity for a change in philosophy and for the creation of a positive programme of action. And that is what happened, with employees' self-management as the foundation of this positive programme.

The second interpretation is corroborated by certain accompanying circumstances and the very abruptness of the change. In this particular period of time, a growing influence upon the "Solidarity" leadership started to be exerted by advisers who were regarded by the authorities as their declared political enemies. These advisers could persuade the union leadership that, by gaining an upper hand in self-managing and independent enterprises, the union could take over power over the economy.

Most probably, various people were motivated by different motives. For some, self-management was an authentic strategic option while for others it was an instrument in the political fight. I would not venture to estimate the proportions of these two groups among those in "Solidarity" who supported the idea of self-management.

Notwithstanding different motivations, declaration of support for self-management was very important for "Solidarity". From that moment on, the trade union organization transgressed a narrow syndicalist frame and became *par excellence* a political organization. The self-management idea or catchword became an important factor mobilizing wide masses of "Solidarity" activists. They were the initiators and organizers in the creation of self-managerial bodies in their workplace. Just as in the autumn of 1980, the energy of union members focused on the formation of their own organization, so in the autumn of 1981 it was directed at the creation of self-management bodies, although the latter movement occurred on a smaller scale. It should be stated here that the enthusiastic attitude of "Solidarity" activists was not shared by rank and file worker members, which formed quite a contrasting picture. Such a situation was also indicated by sociological studies conducted by "Solidarity" itself.

The change in "Solidarity"'s position with regard to self-management also opened up broad possibilities for intellectuals sympathizing with the union to present their liberal views. For them, the idea of self-management became a positive value around which their creative efforts were organized and towards which they were directed. Most often, the drive which these people, as well as the union activists, felt towards the self-management concept was only equalled by their ignorance. Lack of adequate knowledge of the weaknesses and problems of self-management allowed them to opt for possibly its most radical form.

Thus, the significance of the change in "Solidarity"'s position vis à vis self-management consisted not only in the fact that from an opponent it had turned to being a proponent, but also in that it proposed a form self-management with very broad competence,

much broader than had been envisaged in government programmes. The term "Self-Managing Republic" (i. e. Poland) became the fundamental political slogan of "Solidarity". (As can be seen, there was much more at stake than just employees' self-management).

Whether the intentions of "Solidarity" were sincere or not, the speed and scale of change of the organization's stance were viewed with great suspicion by the government. It treated "Solidarity"'s new position as a tactical political manoeuvre, or at least as dangerous romanticism, but not as a sign of the union's readiness to take co-responsibility for moving the country out of its economic crisis. It must be stated that, in many of its moves, "Solidarity" justified such suspicions, as e.g. by persistently declining to support the really necessary price increase decision.

It was in such conditions that, in the middle of 1981, a bitter political struggle took place between the government and "Solidarity" over the shape of employees' self-management<sup>5</sup>. This conflict concentrated around the question of who should appoint an enterprise's director. "Solidarity" insisted that the director should be appointed by a self-management body, while the government that it should be by governmental bodies. Other questions excited less emotions. There was general agreement that the reformed Polish economy should link "Yugoslav" and "Hungarian" elements.

In the course of the sharp political conflict, two very important laws were passed by the Polish Diet on 25. September 1981: the Law on State Enterprises and the Law on Self-Management of an Enterprise's Employees. These two bills were to form the foundation of the economic reform in preparation at that time. Their significance can be compared to that which the Law on Associated labour has for the Yugoslav economic system. The two bills were, on the one hand, a compromise among the proponents of various scopes of enterprise independence and of various forms of employees' self-management, while on the other they deferred solutions to many important problems to a later date. These solutions were introduced after martial law had been declared, that is, in an entirely different political situation.

A model of the Polish economic system, as designer in these two laws, could be presented as follows:

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<sup>5</sup> This conflict is presented in an interesting way in H. Wachtel: »Self-Management Proposals in Poland: 1981«, *Ekonomiska Analiza* 2/1984. This author does, however, commit some errors probably resulting from a not very good recognition of Polish realities. First, it is suggested that the government was an absolute opponent of self-management, while in fact it opposed the radical forms of self-management. Second, differences between the attitudes of »Solidarity« activists and those of plain workers are overlooked, and the movement for self-management is presented as a spontaneous, grass-roots movement, while in reality it was to a large extent inspired from above by the organizational structure of this trade union, with workers themselves exhibiting quite a passive attitude. Third, »Solidarity«'s support for self-management is taken as natural and not entailing any doubts, without due recognition of the evolution of »Solidarity«'s view in this matter, and its possible implications.



The independent, self-managing and self-financing enterprise is the basic element of the economic system. The authorities direct the economy with purely economic instruments. Direct intervention by them in the form of orders ("directives") is limited to a few, clearly defined situations: questions of national defence, elimination of the consequences of natural disasters, fulfilment of international agreements and contracts, etc. Exceptions to this general rule are so-called public utility enterprises, e.g. enterprises in the municipal sector. Their independence is severely limited and they are not subject to self-financing.

Power in an enterprise is held by three bodies: a general assembly of employees (and in cases where the number of employees is higher than 300, an assembly of employees' delegates), an employees' committee, and the director-general. The hierarchically highest body is the general assembly, and the lowest, the director general, who functions as an executive arm of the self-managing bodies<sup>6</sup>. Both the self-managing bodies and the director act independently when carrying out their legally-defined tasks, they can mutually control each other and are able to stop actions related to decisions taken by the other side. The director is able to stop a decision of the employees' committee, if this decision does not conform to legal regulations, and the employees' committee is able to stop a director's decision which is not in conformance with legal regulations and with self-management decisions. In conflicting situations, the ultimate decision is taken by a court or through an arbitration commission.

Over the most controversial issue, of the director's appointment, a compromise solution was adopted consisting of joint decision-making by both sides, i.e. by enterprise self-management and by the state authorities. In the majority of enterprises, the director general has to be appointed by the employees' committee after a competition for the post and the appropriate state authority decides on the acceptance of the self-management appointed candidate. For enterprises "of special significance to the economy" there is a reverse procedure in force. The list containing the names of the latter enterprises was to be put together by the government with appropriate consultations with the trade unions, and presented at a latter date. This has already occurred in fact under martial law, without any consultations with the unions, since the new unions formed under martial law were just being set up, and the list presented turned out to be quite long.

With regard to the more detailed organization and functioning of the enterprise and its self-management, the solutions adopted are very similar to these of the analogous Yugoslav mechanism. An important difference consists in the fact that, while in Yugoslavia the weight of management has been put upon the basic organizations of associated labour (*osnovne organizacije udruženog rada*), that is, on compo-

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<sup>6</sup> These laws did not avoid, however, giving rise to suppositions that self-managerial bodies are only meant to fulfil the task of helping the director in his managerial duties. Thus, e. g. W. Krencik: «Rola samorządu załogi w zreformowanym systemie zarządzania»; mimeograph, Warszawa 1985) turns attention to this phenomenon.

nent parts of the enterprise, in Poland management is being executed at enterprise level.

A number of exceptions from the general rules have been specified, aiming primarily at the limitation of enterprise independence and significance of self-management within the enterprise. This concerns check facts! Those enterprises which are subject to the ministries of national defence, finance, and justice, enterprises functioning abroad, etc.

All in all, in spite of numerous exceptions and limitations, the two laws mentioned granted what is for Eastern Europe an extraordinary degree of independence and scope of self-managerial power to the enterprises.

After these two bills had been passed, an intensive process was begun of organizing new self-managerial bodies in enterprises and of adapting already existing ones to the new rules. Some enterprises succeeded in completing this process before the declaration of martial law on 13 December 1981. A very important role in this process was played by "Solidarity" activists, especially by young people with a university education working in the enterprises (engineers, medium-level management, "white collars" workers). As can be seen, in a period of one year, "Solidarity" underwent an important evolution — from a typical workers' organization with typical trade-unionist goals and features, to a political organization dominated by an industrial intelligentsia with far-reaching political goals.

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As far as scientific thinking related to self-management is concerned, this period was too short to allow the creation and publication of any important works. It was, however, a very important one with regard to discussion, analyses, etc. Many scientists, especially from the younger generation, have "discovered" self-management as an object of study worthy of special attention. In this context, the visit of Branko Horvat to the Institute of Planning in Warsaw, just a few days before martial law was proclaimed, played an important role. The lecture he gave then is often quoted even now in publications on the economics of self-management.

1982 — 1985

A situation of development was interrupted by the proclamation of martial law. The event requires a few words of commentary. Upon its evaluation and interpretation depends the possibility of understanding previous and later occurrences, including those related to self-management.

Two extreme interpretations and opinions regarding the declaration of martial law can often be encountered abroad. According to both, this was the final phase of a fight between "good" and "evil". In

this conflict one of the two sides won and had nothing more to do than eliminate the residual resistance of the defeated enemy and annihilate all that he had achieved in the period 1980—1981. Also according to both interpretations, if not all the achievements of 1980—1981 were eliminated, then it was only due to continued resistance by the defeated side or to errors on the part of the victors, who did not exploit their success to the full. These two interpretations are based however upon very simplified thought schemes, which are unable to grasp the whole depth of the problems, divisions and complications haunting Polish society. In the first of these two interpretations, the fight between "good" and "evil" ended with the victory of "evil". The "good" side is Polish society and its spearhead "Solidarity", fighting for democracy, national independence and welfare. "Evil" is embodied in the authorities, and primarily in the Party, they represent foreign interests in Poland, enforce a totalitarian system, etc. This interpretation does not allow an understanding of many aspects pertinent to the process observed. Thus, for instance, why was introduction of the martial law and its subsequent course relatively peaceful? If it had been true that the authorities were facing the whole of an inimical society or at least the ten million, reportedly internally homogeneous and bellicose organization of "Solidarity", there would have been a much fiercer conflict. Application of physical force by one of the sides may not entirely explain the weakness of the other. Martial law has shown that society's support, and also that of the mass of members of "Solidarity" for the union's leadership was quite moderate. This corroborates the existence of a certain gap between the "Solidarity" leadership and its rank and file members, which could already have been observed just before the proclamation of martial law. The fate of "Solidarity" after its delegalization is also in line with this observation. Several attempts to organize demonstrations or even symbolic strikes to protest against the very unpopular decision of the authorities to increase prices ended without success.

Neither does this interpretation allow understanding of what made the authorities agree to the reactivation of employee self-management, albeit in a more constrained form than that of the bills passed in September, 1981. The explanation that this was enforced by "Solidarity" does not make sense, in view of the actual helplessness of this organization. Equally doubtful is the explanation that this move was enforced by the working class in general. The fate of employee self-management after 1981, like that of other processes, resulted from much more intricate power play between various interests than simply a fight between "evil authorities" and a "good society".

According to the second interpretation, the "good" side was constituted by the authorities together with the Party and the army, they defended socialism in Poland, while the "evil" side was "Solidarity", a counter-revolutionary organization inspired and taken over by imperialist agents, which had been just one step away from bringing down socialism. By taking this reasoning to its absurd conclusion, it seems that the fate of the Polish political system, i. e. of a country

with 37 million inhabitants, depended upon the good or bad will of the CIA.

A more precise evaluation and description of the circumstances in which martial law was introduced does not lie within the scope of this paper. Two aspects, however, should be noted: Poland's international political situation and its economic situation. The country's international political situation did not give the authorities a very large margin for manoeuvre. In this context, the proclamation of martial law may be considered a necessary evil.<sup>7</sup> With regard to the economic situation, this necessitated some very unpopular moves, such as a high price increase, reinstatement of basic work discipline, etc. Making these moves without the introduction of martial law seemed almost impossible.<sup>8</sup>

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Notwithstanding its causes and circumstances, the proclamation of martial law was a heavy blow for employee self-management, and, under martial law, it was weakened in several ways:

— starting on 13 December, 1981, the activity of the self-management bodies, along with that of other organizations, was forbidden (lifting of this interdiction commenced in the spring of 1982);

— many active followers of the self-management idea, activists and intellectuals, were interned or found themselves in an emigré situation, or their activity was limited in some other way;

— within the period of interdiction of self-management activity, the authorities carried out a number of actions which were, according to law, within the competence of self-management, such as the appointment of directors, the creation of enterprise associations and the like, thus placing *faits accomplis* in front of future self-managing bodies;

— the above circumstances had a negative influence on the morale and trust of employees and on their engagement in self-managerial activities.

In the self-management suspension period, the functions of self-managerial bodies were taken over by the director. In the spring of 1982, a very slow process of self-management "revival" commenced. A decision on the reactivation of self-managerial institutions in an enterprise was formally taken by the appropriate minister, responding to a suggestion from a director which had adequate support from the proper political and military authorities. Thus, the fate of self-ma-

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<sup>7</sup> This interpretation found many supporters. Arguments in favour of it and a number of other observations on the Polish situation can be found in the paper by D. Dragosavac: »Poljska i socijalizam«, Naše Teme, 6/1983, which displays a broad knowledge of the subject.

<sup>8</sup> Such an opinion is presented not only by government-supporting economists and politicians, but also by many independent, and even emigré economists. The latter include, e. g., one living presently in Paris, Waldemar Kuczyński, previously vice editor-in-chief of the »Tygodnik Solidarność« (»Solidarity Weekly«), nowadays an extremely fair analyst of the economic situation of Poland.

nagement was placed in the hands of its most ardent opponents: the directors and the economic administration. This process of resuscitation was accelerated at the end of 1982 by pressure put on the directors and the economic administration by political factors. An important role in the mobilization of this pressure was played by the Diet, especially by the Diet Committee on Employee Self-Management, and also by the Minister for Economic Reform. At the end of 1982, self-management was functioning in 3,620 enterprises out of a total of 6,580.

One expression of this political pressure was, for instance, an obligation imposed on ministers and state authorities to take the decision allowing self-managerial bodies to recommence their activities within a deadline of three months, i.e. up to 19 March, 1983, this stipulation being contained in the bill on the special legal regulations in force during the period of suspension under martial law, passed on 18 December 1982. According to this bill, only those self-managerial bodies which were elected in accordance with the law of 25 September, 1981 could be reactivated. In other enterprises, new elections were to be held and new self-management statutes adopted. From this moment on, there was an acceleration of reactivation of self-management bodies. At the end of October 1984, self-management was active in 6,403 enterprises, i. e. in 87% of those entitled to have it, which employed altogether almost 6 million employees, out of a total of approximately 11 million of employees in the social sector of the economy.<sup>10</sup>

But, the revival of self-management did not mean a full return to all the self-management rights resulting from the laws of September 1981. Limitations on those rights were of both a direct and an indirect nature. Direct limitations consisted in transferring certain rights formally belonging to self-management to other bodies such as the directors, the central economic administration (ministers), and, at the end of the period in question, also to the newly-formed trade unions. Indirect limitations consisted in general constraints being put on enterprise independence in favour of the central economic administration, and in the creation of large associations of enterprises. To this set of limitations should be added the broadening of the list of enterprises which had a narrower scope for self-management and independence. The range of limitations was in itself not quite uniform: in some domains there was a gradual retreat from limitations, in

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<sup>9</sup> Representatives of the authorities also agree with this opinion. W. Baka, who was the Minister of Economic Reform during the period 1981—1985, wrote in a lecture prepared for a conference at Warsaw University in November 1985: »In spite of the fact that, due to socio-political tensions and conditions of the martial law period this process (of self-management development — R. Sz.) was delayed, since 1983 it progresses according to assumptions made«. (W. Baka: »Wyzwania rozwojowe dla Polski. Spojrzenie ekonomisty«, p. 14. Paper for the conference: Strategia rozwoju społecznogospodarczego Polski, Warszawa, 28—29 November 1985).

<sup>10</sup> Pełnomocnik rządu do spraw reformy gospodarczej: Raport o realizacji reformy gospodarczej w 1984 (Secretary of State for Economic Reform: Report on implementation of economic reform in 1984), Warszawa, August 1985, pp. 16, 17.

the other ones, new limitations appeared. Evaluation of the resulting direction of these changes depends upon who one asks. Circles close to the government hold the common opinion that the general direction is positive, i. e. it is leading to a strengthening of self-management. The opinions of economists supporting the self-management idea, and not connected with the government, are however quite to the contrary. The actual direction of the evolution of self-management will be evident in the very near future, since according to law, all limitations at present set upon self-management with regard to the bills of 1981 should cease from 1 January 1986.

Besides the formal limitations there were frequent cases of placing illegal limitations on the competence of self-management, especially by the directors and the economic administration.

The first and most important formal constraint to which self-management was subject was deprivation of the right to appoint the director (all the other competences of self-management were brought back). With time, this limitation was gradually lifted and in 1984 employees' committees appointed 200 directors of enterprises.<sup>11</sup> Simultaneously, however, a number of small but important changes in the enterprises organization were introduced, which weakened self-management's position *vis-à-vis* the director. These changes included: the removal of the right to determine the director's wage, and a modification in the way in which the conflicts between the director and self-management were resolved. Since that time the director can stop implementation of a self-management decision not only when this decision does not comply with the law, but also when this decision threatens quite undefined social interests. Moreover, this director's veto caused instantaneous halting of any action related to the self-management decision. This action can be undertaken anew when a court or an arbitrating commission rules in favour of the self-management side. In the case of a director's decision it is the other way around: when this decision is vetoed by self-management it can nevertheless still be implemented, until a court or arbitrating commission possibly rules in favour of self-management.

The self-management revival was accompanied by equipping the economic administration, mainly the ministries, with the power to suspend self-managerial bodies in particular enterprises for periods of up to 6 months, and even with the power to dissolve the self-management function, this power occasionally being utilized. In order, however, to stop potential abuses, the Council of State was vested in 1983 with the right to annul any administration decision in this domain. The economic administration also gained broad possibilities of intervention in the internal affairs of an enterprise, including the power to formulate and assign concrete tasks, which went beyond the scope envisaged in the law on enterprises. This kind of limitation resulted partly from the economic situation. A tremendous market imbalance, which occurred at the moment when the economic reform started made it impossible for the market to perform the function of

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

resource allocation. Under these circumstances it was centrally-administered rationing that took over resource allocation, which, inevitably, led to limitations on enterprise independence. According to widely shared opinion, however, such a situation has a tendency to petrify because on the one hand it ensures a "peaceful life" for enterprises and on the other provides a *raison d'être* for the economic administration.

One great danger to the independence and self-management of enterprises results from the process of monopolization taking place in the economy. This consists of the creation of huge integrated associations ("socialist corporations") in which enterprises tend to lose their independence and even their legal identity. This process gained greater momentum during 1985, with the central economic administration acting as the initiating agent. This was primarily the consequence of the fact that, from 1986, the possibilities for the administration's direct intervention in the internal affairs of enterprises are limited. The administration, unable or unwilling to utilize instruments of indirect control wishes to shape such economic structures, which would make it easier for it to direct the economy. Directors of enterprises are allies of the administration in that respect. The only real braking force in this process are the self-managerial bodies, since it is they that make the final decisions on joining an association, and they often reject proposals to join such associations. There are, however, certain fears that the resistance of self-management bodies can in future be broken. This is justified by the fact that enterprises, when joining an association, gain certain advantages, including a significant increase in wages. (Not by any means because of a greater efficiency of the "socialist corporations", but because of their greater bargaining power.)

A further limitation on self-management's competence with respect to what was envisaged in the laws of September 1981 has been established by a wide interpretation of the notions "enterprise of particular significance for the economy" and "public utility enterprise", as applied by the government when compiling the lists of such enterprises in March of 1983. (Approximately 1,400 enterprises were listed in the first category, and 434 in the second.) In such organizations, independence and self-management are constrained, as already noted. The list of public utility enterprises includes, for instance, collieries, a surprising fact, since the category in question should include only such enterprises, which by virtue of their type of activity cannot earn their own subsistence but must function irrespective of their financial performance (e.g. schools, hospitals, city cleaning services and the like), and are thus not subject to self-financing or the law of insolvency.

Another threat to employee self-management comes from the creation and development of new trade unions. These were initiated and supported by the political authorities after the previously existing trade unions (including »Solidarity«) had been dissolved. Formation of these unions entailed the necessity of transferring a part of self-management competences concerning wages, work conditions, social

affairs, etc. to the newly-created trade union bodies. This caused the possibility of conflicts between self-management and the unions, and such conflicts are far more dangerous for the former than the latter, since the political authorities, which have a decisive voice in these matters, are more apt to support the "certain" union rather than an "uncertain" self-management.<sup>12</sup> Development of the trade unions also creates a threat to enterprise independence — the unions are organized according to the classical branch principle, and since 1984 have also had a central board. They incline to prefer unified systemic solutions encompassing whole branches, and this especially applies to wages. Thus, the trade unions are a "natural ally" of those who support the "socialist corporations".

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The ups and downs of self-management, as depicted above, resulted from the interest game of various socio-professional and political forces. It therefore seems useful to analyse the attitudes of the main participants with regard to self-management.

Political authorities display an ambivalent attitude towards self-management. On the one hand, it seems, they are not opposed to the idea of the broader working masses taking over a portion of enterprise management duties, responsibility, etc. Such a view is corroborated by numerous declarations made by representatives of the highest authorities.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> As we are taught by history, authorities in the countries of so-called »real socialism« have often utilized trade unions in the liquidation of self-management. See B. Horvat, *op. cit.*

<sup>13</sup> At a meeting with representatives of employees' self-management, which took place in mid-1985, General Jaruzelski said, for instance: »The workers' movement, from the beginning of its existence, put forward, together with the question of ownership of production means, the question of working-class, employees' participation in management. All the historical changes which occurred in this domain, resulted from the fight of the workers' class, of working masses for their rights. The process of the economic implementation of social ownership requires: dialectical unity of central planning and the initiatives of employees' collectives: persons professionally dealing with management and participation in management of possibly the broadest circles of working people. (...). The development of self-management stems from the very essence of our system, in which it is organically implemented. (...). The whole of society is the owner of the socialist enterprise. (...) On the other hand, the host of this enterprise, as a portion of the whole national property — is its collective, through the intermediary of its democratically elected, democratically acting and vested with the appropriate competences of self-management. This is the essence of the doctrine, of the philosophy of employees' self-management functioning and we must more and more deeply confirm it in practice. Self-management is then the way to overcome the old and the, finally, harmful division into »we« — »they«, »ours« — »theirs«. It is also an essential condition for strengthening the motivation to productive work and effective managing, to technological, organizational and economic progress«. This speech was published in both the central and regional press on 26 July, 1985. As can be seen, such statements could be signed by any, even an extreme, supporter of self-management.



Simultaneously, however, these authorities, still influenced by the impression of the period 1980—81, are afraid that self-management bodies can be seized by the political opposition. This feeling is deepened by the fact that in the employees' committees there are a lot of ex-activists of »Solidarity«, and by the plans of the underground »Solidarity«, which treats self-management as its last chance.<sup>14</sup> It should be stated here that, irrespective of the goals which the political opposition wants to attain, it regards self-management as instrumental in their attainment. The doubts of the authorities are also caused by a lack of conviction as to the economic efficiency of self-management.

Directors and the economic administration constitute a group with extraordinarily definite and homogeneous views on self-management. If it had been up to them, self-management would already have been annihilated. This group uses arguments related to the alleged economic inefficiency of self-management, and its ineffectiveness in the decision-making process, but the cause of their negative attitude lies mainly in the fact that self-management changes the previous rules of the game to which this group had become well and conveniently accustomed. It is this very group that most often initiates limitations upon self-management and violates its rights. Cases of self-management rights violations have become so common that the Supreme Chamber of Inspection has been forced to undertake a special inspection operation. This showed that, in more than one third of the enterprises inspected, the rights and competences of the employees' committee had been illegally constrained.

The attitudes of this socio-professional group are highly influenced by the community of engineers-technicians, brought up on the principles of the »scientific organization of work«, and constituting the core of the managerial stratum. It is within this community that, more often than anywhere else, the opponents of self-management and of other assumptions on which the economic reform is founded are met.

The scientific and journalistic community (economists, sociologists, lawyers) is very heterogeneous. Both extremes of attitudes can be encountered here, but a moderate sympathy for self-management is dominant. (See below for a further note on the attitudes of economists). This community is, though, more united on the subject of the defence of enterprise independence.

Employees of enterprises do not present a unified opinion, either, but instead of a distinct division into followers and opponents of self-management, there is a division into employees being more or less active in self-managerial functions. The most active are those

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<sup>14</sup> A well-known economic journalist, who can be treated as a trustworthy exponent of the official line, has expressed these apprehensions in the following way: »The opposition, however, did not accept the solutions adopted — it could not swallow defeat. There was only one chance left: groping for the envisaged goal with small steps, through the creation of bridgeheads, by gaining particular self-managerial bodies, manipulating them and steering in the desired, always the same direction«. Z. Szeliga: »Walka a samorząd w Organice-Zachem — W dwa ognie«, *Polityka*, 46/1985.

employees who have been elected to the employees' committee; much less active are those elected to the delegates' assembly, and still less, other rank and file employees. Employee attitudes were negatively influenced by the suspension of self-management under martial law and by the way in which self-management was reactivated afterwards. These attitudes, and the degree of support given by employees to the self-management idea depend to a large extent on whether a given self-managerial body was elected before or after the declaration of martial law. Those elected before the declaration have enjoyed greater trust and support from employees, which is why they have turned out usually to be more active. In some enterprises, the employees have become so discouraged (or the need for self-management has been so low) that self-managerial bodies have not to date been created in them despite the existence of the formal right and even duty to do so, and in approximately one third of the cases, existing self-managerial bodies are purely formal constructs. An important threat to self-management arises from the fatigue of people caused by the daily difficulties, which leads to a decrease in their activity in the self-managerial bodies, especially in the general assembly of employees (or delegates).<sup>15</sup>

For the first time in the history of self-management in Poland, one can speak of the appearance of a numerous and quite energetic "self-managerial lobby", which includes a majority of self-management activists, a number of scientists and economic journalists, as well as some politicians.

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After a period of organizational effort, self-management bodies started their true activity in 1983. This activity has become the object of numerous studies. Too little time has elapsed to be able to draw general conclusions, but some first remarks can be made:

The functioning of self-managerial bodies did not introduce any "revolution" into the organization and management of enterprises. The strongest position is still held by the director general<sup>16</sup>. Self-mana-

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<sup>15</sup> Concluding one of the studies, its authors state: »Until now a common »self-management attitude« has not as yet taken shape among enterprise staffs«, J. Hausner, J. Indraszkiewicz: »Samorząd — jaki jest, a jaki być powinien — Przepychanka«, *Polityka* 45/1985.

<sup>16</sup> In April 1985 the governmental Centre of Societal Opinion Studies conducted a study on the influence of self-management on the execution of authority in enterprises. The study covered 334 randomly chosen enterprises. In comments on its results one can read, for instance: »The domain considered by all the groups (socio-professional groups within the enterprises — R. Sz.) as being under the control of directors include decisions which are crucial for enterprise strategy, i. e. decisions on production volumes, directions of development, income and profit destinations, as well as connections with the environment«. P. Ruzzkowski: »W. kręgu samorządności«, *Życie Gospodarcze* 44/1985.

gerial bodies have a faint, but observable influence on enterprises<sup>17</sup>. Self-management contributed to a widening of the group of people involved in enterprise management, and forced the directors and the state administration to public justification of their decisions. However, self-managerial bodies still have to fight for recognition as legal "householders" of enterprises<sup>18</sup>.

Self-management is probably the only social force in enterprises which defends their independence, and opposes both overly aggressive interventions by the administration<sup>19</sup> and the creation of monopolies.

The fears that the introduction of self-management would result in an increase of wages at the expense of the development fund proved to be unjustified<sup>20</sup>. (There is pressure for wage increases but its source can rather be found in trade unions than in self-management).

On the other hand, hopes that self-management would distinctly enhance efficiency were not fulfilled<sup>21</sup>.

<sup>17</sup> »Clashes of directorial and self-management influences (...) can be illustrated by the example of division of profit into individually assigned bonuses: in 43.3% of enterprises, employees' committees elaborated their own schemes for this purpose, but only 15.6% of the committees succeeded in carrying through the execution of these schemes, while 23.1% had to make do with just the introduction of modifications to schemes forwarded by the director«, *ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> Responding to a poll directed by the Institute of State and Law of the Polish Academy of Sciences to self-managerial bodies the employees' committee of one of enterprises located in Warsaw wrote: »In a vast majority of cases, social groups, organizations, administrative bodies and even legal counsels of enterprises do not take into actual consideration the fact, that there are and function in an enterprise three bodies on an equal footing: a general assembly of employees (delegates), an employees' committee and the director, considering the fact that the enterprise is represented by the director alone, while treating the general assembly and employees' committee as a social organization under the heading »self-management««. I. Dryll: »Portret samorządu«, *Życie Gospodarcze* 33/1985.

<sup>19</sup> It seems that the most spectacular example of that was provided by the conflict between the self-management body of Warsaw Metalworks (Huta Warszawa) and the Minister of Metallurgy in the first half of 1985. The self-management body protested against the action of this ministry in checking the director's qualifications, considering this action as being an illegal intervention in the enterprise's affairs. This conflict was taken to court, which ruled in favour of the minister but forced him to provide a clear explanation of the goals and methods of his action, which in itself should be regarded as a success for self-management.

<sup>20</sup> As can be seen from the results of the inspection performed by the Supreme Inspection Chamber, presented on 26 July 1985 during a meeting of Diet Commission on Employees' Self-Management, in the vast majority of enterprises studied, employees' committees properly understood the problems of enterprise development: 60—80% of profit was destined for the development fund, while 10—15% of profit for social and housing purposes. See I. Dryll, *op. cit.*

<sup>21</sup> Authors of an analysis of self-management, who took into account the influence exerted by self-management on the improvement of economic efficiency, execution of responsibility from top management, etc., reached the following conclusion: »Study of these problems leads to sceptic evaluation of previous achievements as well as perspectives of staff self-management«. J. Hausner, J. Indraszkiewicz, *op. cit.*

Summing up, according to the words of the ex-minister of economic reform, "the functioning of employees' self-management is advantageous for internal adaptation of the economy to reform"<sup>22</sup>

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The period 1982—1985 saw the flourishing of scientific inquiries into employees' self-management. Institutes belonging to the Polish Academy of Sciences, sectoral (ministerial) institutes, and especially the Institute of Work and Social Affairs, university-type schools, including the Academy of Social Sciences, associated with the Party, as well as individual scientists, conducted numerous studies, primarily of a sociological nature. The problems of self-management occupy quite a lot of space in socio-economic journals, particularly so in "Życie Gospodarcze" („Economic Life"). There is also a separate journal devoted to the problems of employees' self-management — "Tygodnik Robotniczy" ("Workers' Weekly"). This domain is becoming the subject of scientific conferences, some of them international in scope.<sup>23</sup>

Apart from studies meant primarily for self-management activists,<sup>24</sup> sociological analyses of various cases, etc., theoretical works from the field of self-management economics appeared. These works are very few and far between though. Besides a few books<sup>25</sup>, there are many papers in journals<sup>26</sup>, separate chapters in books<sup>27</sup>, sections in papers<sup>28</sup>, and *en passant* remarks in a variety of other books and articles. This mass of literature first of all takes up such subjects as the necessity for socializing state ownership, the efficiency of decision-making in self-managerial enterprises, the rationality of these

<sup>22</sup> W. Baka, op. cit.

<sup>23</sup> Two Polish-Yugoslav conferences organized in 1984 and 1985 as the result of the initiative of the theoretical Party journals »Socjalizam« and »Nowe Drogi«, deserve special attention here. Well-known scientists and politicians from both sides took part in these conferences. A report of the second conference, presenting all the most important problems of self-management in Poland, was published in Borba (Zagreb) on 28, 29 and 30 October 1985 (see: N. Burzan: »Porodajne muke«, N. Burzan: »Nedostatak materijalne baze«, N. Burzan: »Oslabljena pozicija«).

<sup>24</sup> See B. Błażejczyk: *Samorządność załogi przedsiębiorstwa*, Warszawa 1985, B. Ziemianin: *Organy przedsiębiorstwa państwowego*, Szczecin 1985.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. B. Błaszczuk: *Od współzarządzania do samorządności*, Warszawa 1984, T. B. Jaworski: *Demokracja w przedsiębiorstwie*, Warszawa 1984, W. Jermakowicz: *Samorząd pracowniczy. Nadzieje i niespełnienia*, Warszawa 1983.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. B. Błaszczuk, M. Bąbrowski: »Efektywność ekonomiczna i społeczna samorządności w przedsiębiorstwie«, *Ekonomista*, 3/1985, R. Szul: *Oeconomica Polona*, 3—4/1983.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. A. K. Koźmiński: *Po wielkim szoku*, Warszawa 1982, J. Mujżel i Sz. Jakubowicz (red.): *Funkcjonowanie gospodarki polskiej. Doświadczenia, problemy, tendencje*, Warszawa 1984.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. E. Łukawer: »Teorie funkcjonowania gospodarki socjalistycznej. Polskie dyskusje«, *Ekonomista* 1—2/1985.

decisions (horizon of decisions, consumption pressure, innovations, etc.), responsibility for decisions, external conditions of the functioning of self-managerial enterprises, etc. These analyses feature, on the average, a cautious optimism as to the possibility of the efficient functioning of a self-managerial enterprise.

This literature is, however, not an accurate reflection of the attitude of Polish economists to self-management, since the subject is taken up mainly by the self-management supporters. Those who are against it are most probably convinced that self-management will sooner or later wither away, so that it is unworthy of public criticism. Critical opinions on self-management are most frequent among specialists in management and organization. They consider the "managerial system" to be always more effective, irrespective of the economic-political setting<sup>29</sup>. This results, according to them, from the fact that skillful management has a decisive influence on an enterprises' results, while self-management introduces an element of dilettantism, constrains the freedom of choice of the directors and waters down responsibility. They are inclined to treat self-management as a necessary evil, enforced by the political situation, or as a beautiful, but unrealistic idea of the socialist-utopian kind. Such an opinion is quite frequent among Polish economists.

Thus, the opinion of Polish economists on self-management is rather ambivalent. Some take pains not to establish one, definite opinion. One of them, for instance (A. A. Koźmiński) writes in one place<sup>30</sup> that, although self-managerial enterprises are slightly less effective than the best managerial firms, self-management has, indeed, great social value, while another reference<sup>31</sup> shows him shifting accents and stating that self-management may be accepted as a necessary evil, since although it is much more noble than the managerial system, there is no evidence indicating that it might ever equal the managerial system with regard to effectiveness. Another view sometimes encountered proposes that self-management is "second best". (Understanding, in this case, that "the best" is politically impossible to implement, being represented by the capitalist market economy). The opinions of economists and the wider public are greatly influenced by the economic difficulties of Yugoslavia. For many people, these difficulties constitute evidence on the inefficiency of the self-management system.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Cf. K. Koźniewski: »Samorząd — trzeźwa rezerwa«, Tu i Teraz 6—7/1982, A. K. Koźmiński — statement during an editorial discussion, Przegląd Organizacji, 8/1982, and also reports of N. Burzan from the Polish-Yugoslav conference, especially the portion related to the opinions of B. Gliński.

<sup>30</sup> See note 27.

<sup>31</sup> See note 29.

<sup>32</sup> This results from a general understatement of the importance of such factors influencing the functioning of the Yugoslav economy as: federal state organization, multinational population composition, regional differences in development levels, etc., and linking all difficulties with workers' self-management. I emphasized this point in my paper: »Gospodarka, społeczeństwo i państwo w Polsce i Jugosławii«, Ekonomista 1—2/1985

In theoretical studies, besides the results of Polish research, foreign experiences are also utilized, especially the works of Branko Horvat<sup>33</sup>, Jaroslav Vanek and Benjamin Ward, published in English, the last one having, apparently unintentionally, become one of the most frequently cited economists, referred to in publications related to the economics of self-management.

In conclusion, one can state that workers' (employees') self-management is at present an important and noticed part of the discussion in Polish economy, as well as in the fields of sociology and the legal sciences.

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As stated at the beginning of this paper, the history of workers' self-management in Poland to date is a history of short ups and long downs. Is this history going to be repeated again? At present, in contradistinction to previous periods, there is a quasi-balance of forces between the supporters and adversaries of self-management, and there are a lot of people undecided about it. In this situation, the fate of workers' self-management depends upon the activity of the workers themselves: its development will depend on whether it will turn out to be the authentic need of working people and whether it will contribute to the process of solving the burning problems of the Polish economy. The smooth development of self-management requires satisfaction of both these conditions, because otherwise the present delicate balance may be destroyed — to the advantage of the adversaries of self-management.

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## RADNIČKO SAMOUPRAVLJANJE U POLJSKOJ

*Roman SZUL*

*Re z i m e*

*Za istoriju radničkog samoupravljanja u Poljskoj karakteristično je smenjivanje kratkih perioda uspona i dugih perioda pada ili čak odumiranja. Periodi uspona imali su mesto u vremenu burnih politi-*

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<sup>33</sup> This is not admitted by everybody. I have the impression that the graphical scheme contained in the publication of Aś K. Koźmiński (see note 27) in which the monocentric (managerial) system is represented as a pyramid, while the polycentric, self-managerial system is represented as an hourglass, is borrowed from a work by B. Horvat.

čkih događaja, aktivizacije radničke klase i celog društva, slabljenja ili nepostojanja centralne vlasti a periodi pada — u vremenu političkog mira, pasivnosti radničke klase i jake centralne vlasti.

Prvi period uspona bio je u godinama 1944/45. kada su radnici samostalno preuzimali napuštene ili lišene od vlasnika fabrike, uklanjali ruševine i organizovali proizvodnju. Da bi bolje organizovali svoju delatnost radnici su osnivali fabričke komitete. Legitimnost fabričkih komiteta u to doba bila je potvrđena dekretom o fabričkim komitetima od 1945. godine. Ovaj uspon samoupravljanja završio se s uspostavljanjem centralne vlasti i nešto kasnijim uspostavljanjem staljinističkih načina upravljanja i sa stabilizacijom političke situacije u zemlji.

Nešto slično se dogodilo i u periodu 1956—58. U 1956. godini, u vreme burnih protesta radničke klase i političke aktivizacije celog društva masovno su se osnivali radnički saveti u preduzećima. Ovi događaji prouzrokovali su u oktobru iste godine smenu vladajuće ekipe a u novembru zvanično priznanje pokreta radničkog samoupravljanja u Zakonu o radničkim savetima. Ovaj je zakon davao radničkim savetima veoma široke kompetencije. Međutim, ideja samoupravljanja nije imala podršku od strane političkog rukovodstva zemlje koje je, koristeći smanjenje političke aktivnosti radničke klase, već u 1958. godini izdalo novi Zakon o radničkom samoupravljanju kojim su radnički saveti bili praktički podređeni fabričkim partijskim i sindikalnim organizacijama.

Slabljenje samostalnosti radničkih saveta bio je jedan od uzroka slabljenja interesovanja i podrške od strane radnika što je prouzrokovalo još višu zavisnost radničkih saveta od direkcija, partije, sindikata itd. U takvim okolnostima sve je višu popularnost među radnicima dobijala ideja slobodnih sindikata poput sindikata u kapitalističkim zemljama.

Takvo stanje se odrazilo u štrajkovima 1980. godine kada su radnici tražili osnivanje nezavisnih sindikata, povećanje plata, zamrzavanje cena, skraćivanje radne nedelje itd. Oni su tražili takođe demokratizaciju političkog sistema. Među zahtevima radnika nije bilo samoupravljanja.

Za razliku od radnika i novoosnovanih nezavisnih sindikata, neki intelektualci (prvenstveno ekonomisti a u tome i vladina komisija za privrednu reformu) predložili su radničko samoupravljanje kao jedan od bitnih elemenata novog privrednog sistema. Takav predlog naišao je na podršku vlade i partije.

Radnici i njihovi sindikati u prvim mesecima svog postojanja (jesen 1980, zima 1980/81) odbijali su ideju radničkog samoupravljanja, smatrajući da je to pokušaj prebacivanja na radnike tereta izvlačenja privrede iz krize, da je to taktički potez usmeren na razbijanje sindikata i da upravljanje preduzećima treba da ostane posao stručnjaka (direkcije) a ne i radnika jer oni nemaju ni odgovarajuće kvalifikacije ni želju.

Stanje se radikalno promenilo u junu 1981. kada se rukovodstvo najvećeg sindikata „Solidarnost” izjasnio za samoupravljanje u najra-

dikalnijim obliku. To je izazvalo politički konflikt sa vladom koja se izjašnjavala za samoupravljanje u umerenijem obliku.

U toku žestoke borbe između vlade i „Solidarnosti” 25. septembra 1981, Sejm je usvojio dva zakona: o preduzećima i o samoupravljanju koji su trebali da postanu osnova privredne reforme. Ovi zakoni bili su kompromis između vlade i sindikata, pa ipak davali su velike mogućnosti za samoupravljanje. Istovremeno se odvijao proces osnivanja samoupravnih institucija u preduzećima. Vodeću ulogu u tom procesu igrali su aktivisti „Solidarnosti”. Za razliku od sindikalnih aktivista interesovanje radničkih masa za samoupravljanje bilo je znatno manje ili čak nije postojalo.

Uvođenje ratnog stanja 13. decembra 1981. prekinulo je ovaj proces a samoupravne institucije kao i druge društvene organizacije bile su suspendovane. Odstranjivanje suspendovanja samoupravljanja u pojedinim preduzećima otpočelo je u proleću 1982, ali je do kraja godine taj proces tekao veoma sporo. Ubrzanje ovog procesa teklo je u 1983. i 1984. godini. Sada gotovo svako preduzeće, koje prema zakonu ima pravo na samoupravljanje, ima samoupravljanje. Međutim, istovremeno sa ukidanjem suspendovanja samoupravljanja uvodila su se različita ograničenja koja su se odnosila prvenstveno na mogućnost izbora direktora, na odnose između direktora i samoupravnih organa i odnose između preduzeća i državnih organa. Neka ograničenja bila su postepeno eliminisana, međutim, istovremeno bila su uvođena neka nova, tako da opšti pravac promena nije jasan.

Takvo stanje u izvesnom stepenu izraz je ravnoteže snaga između protivnika i pristalica samoupravljanja. Privredna administracija, direktori i uopšte sloj (starijih) inženjera i tehničara pogotovo su jednostrano protivnici samoupravljanja. Najviše pristalica radničko samoupravljanje ima među članovima radničkih saveta, među (mlađim) ekonomskim novinarima i naučnicima. Stav političkog rukovodstva je ambivalentan. Za razliku od prethodnih perioda (posle 1944/45. i posle 1956. godine) on nije a priori negativan.

Radničko samoupravljanje u većini preduzeća deluje tek 2—3 godine. U to vreme naišlo je na mnoge probleme: otpori od strane administracije, nedostatak iskustva, u mnogim preduzećima nedostatak interesovanja i poverenja od strane radnika (naročito u onim preduzećima u kojima su izbori za samoupravne organe bili sprovedeni posle uvođenja ratnog stanja), pokušaji ograničenja samostalnosti preduzeća, osnivanje novih sindikata i sl. Delovanje samoupravljanja predmet je mnogih analiza i istraživanja (naročito socioloških). Prema ovim analizama uvođenje samoupravljanja nije imalo velikog uticaja na način upravljanja u preduzeću: vodeću ulogu i dalje zadržava direktor. Što se tiče sadržine samoupravnih odluka nisu se potvrdila ni pesimistička ni optimistička očekivanja. Radničko samoupravljanje nije izazvalo povećanje potrošnje na štetu akumulacije, ali isto tako nije uticalo na povećanje produktivnosti rada ni poboljšanje efikasnosti poslovanja.

U poslednje vreme samoupravljanje je postalo takođe predmet interesovanja ekonomske teorije koja se bavi prvenstveno mogućnosti-



*ma i uslovima efikasnog funkcioniranja radničkog samoupravljanja. Iako među ekonomistima ima mnogo pristalica samoupravljanja, opšti stav ekonomista je veoma uzdržan i skeptičan. Veliki uticaj na takvo stanje ima, između ostalog, privredna kriza u Jugoslaviji za koju se često kaže da je rezultat samoupravljanja.*

*Dalji razvitak radničkog samoupravljanja u Poljskoj zavisiće od toga da li će dobiti veću podršku radnika i da li će ubediti političare i ekonomiste u svoju ekonomsku efikasnost.*