

strano drugim kompanijama. Ovo ujedinjavanje nije uvek potpuno. Neki zaposleni radnici ne žele da postanu vlasnici iz različitih razloga. Možemo da istaknemo da je cilj proučavanih radničkih kompanija bio taj da radnici u što većem broju postanu vlasnici. Ovaj je cilj bio zasnovan na nastojanju da se izbegnu nepotrebni sukobi interesa.

Da sumiramo: Radničke kompanije u kojima su zaposleni i vlasnici i nevlasnici — mogu imati problema. Strategija za smanjivanje konflikata sastoji se u proširivanju svojinskih prava na sve zaposlene, tj. u distribuciji vlasništva. Postoji veliki rizik od paralisanja radničke kompanije konfliktom između zaposlenih vlasnika i nevlasnika. Ako distribucija vlasništva nije cilj, postoji rizik od koncentracije vlasništva i od sve većeg približavanja radničke kompanije tradicionalnoj kompaniji.

9. PREPORUKE ZA DALJA ISTRAŽIVANJA

U ovom radu istaknuto je da različiti problemi distribucije, naročito oni ekonomske prirode, imaju opšti značaj i da njih treba pobliže istražiti. Izgleda logično da se problemi ekonomske prirode rešavaju egzaktnijim definisanjem ciljeva radničkih fabrika, diskutovanjem različitih oblika distribucije vlasništva i boljim upoznavanjem zaposlenih sa ekonomskom materijom.

PARTICIPATION STRUCTURES IN THE BELGIAN ECONOMY

J. LAURENS, W. LAURENS and R. STALLAERTS*

1. PARTICIPATION STRUCTURES

After and in part, due to the consensus in the Second World War (1), the social organization of the Belgian economy was restructured by the 20/9/1948 act. This law created participation structures on all levels of the economy. Excluding minor changes, this framework was left fundamentally unchanged. (2)

1.1. THE ENTERPRISE LEVEL

Joint consultation and decision-making takes place in the factory council and in the committee for safety and health. The trade-union delegation functions to defend the views of the workers.

1.1.1. The factory council (ondernemingsraad)

According to the 1948 act (3), each private enterprise (4) employing more than 50 people (5) constitutes a factory council. More substantial enterprises can establish councils in each technical exploitation entity (6). The 1979 elections installed 3,240 councils (7).

The head of the factory or his delegated manager is chairman of the council; he also freely chooses the employer delegation, mostly highly-qualified management personnel. The representatives of the workers, equal in number (8) are chosen by the workers from lists presented by the official trade unions. Elections take place every four years. Delegates have a protected statute (9). The council has a meeting at least once a month, arranged by the management head or at the request of at least half of the members (10).

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Competences of the factory council

Concerning economic-financial matters, the council has a limited advisory competence. On social matters and in connection with the organization of work, the council has control right and decision competence if unanimity is reached. The head of the factory is obliged to inform the council on the life of the factory and on current and future policy. The members of the council and the delegates of the workers have to give some information on their meetings.

a. Information and advice

— economic and financial information.

1. The head of the factory has to give every newly-elected council basic information on the firm.
 2. At least every three months, he has to obtain data on the productivity and the activity of the enterprise.
 3. Regularly and ultimately, at the end of the fiscal year, he has to present further information, surveys and documents on the results obtained by the firm.
- especially, the management head has the duty to give the council the opportunity to judge on employment policy and on eventual use of state subsidies.
- working conditions, work organization, vocational training, personnel management.

The quality of information should be such that the members of the council have a clear picture of the state and further prospects of the firm, and of the implications for organization, employment and personnel policy (11).

The members of the factory council can criticize, ask for complementary information and give their opinion.

The chairman of the council has to specify what the impact of these interventions will be (12).

When requested, the council gives advice to higher consultation bodies.

b. Unanimous decision right

All decisions are to be taken unanimously. This gives parties a veto right. The field of competence, however, is limited.

- drafting of work regulations;
- establishing of general criteria in case of dismissal and re-employment;
- fixing of holiday-periods;
- establishing rules for use of 'credit hours' (13);
- management of social affairs of the firm for the personnel (if not managed by their own);
- search for measures leading to a spirit of cooperation between head of factory and workers (14).

c. Control function

- control on the eventual use of state aid;
- control on application of industrial legislation;
- control on application of social legislation;
- control on application of criteria for vocational qualification.

d. Information duty

The workers have to be informed on the agenda and decisions of the factory council.

1.1.2. *The committee of safety and health*

In this joint committee established by the 1948 act, workers and employers consult on the specific problem of protection, safety and health of the workers and the conditions in the workplaces.

The composition, election and functioning of this body are analogous to those of the factory council. Unanimity of viewpoints, however, is not necessary to induce action.

1.1.3. *The trade union delegation*

The trade union delegation forms the most important body to defend the rights of the workers in the enterprise.

On 17 June 1947, a convention was signed between employers and trade unions on the principles and the functioning of the trade union delegation. On the basis of this convention and according to trade union strength in different sectors, trade union delegations were organized in the period from 1947 to 1971. The National Collective Agreement of 24/5/71 reinforced the power of the official trade unions (15). In this agreement rights and duties were described as follows (16):

"Article 2: The organizations that signed this document support the following principles: the employed do recognize the necessity of the legal authority of the enterprise heads, and consider it an honour to perform their job dutifully. The employers respect the dignity of the workers and consider it an honour to treat them with justice. They commit themselves not to hinder either in a direct or indirect way the freedom of organization and the free development of their organizations."

"Article 4: The signing interprofessional organizations commit themselves to recommend their affiliated organizations:

- respectively the enterprise heads and the trade union delegates to request to show in all circumstances a sense of justice, fairness and reconciliation that determines the good social relations in the enterprise."

In Articles 11-15, the competence of the trade union delegation is described. It includes:

- labour relations;
- negotiations on collective agreements;
- control over the application in the enterprise of social legislation and collective and other agreements;
- the right to be heard by the enterprise head in case of conflict;
- the right to be informed beforehand of changes in contractual or usual labour and payment conditions (especially concerning wage-scales and occupational classification).

Members (and deputies) of the trade union delegation receive a protected status; they cannot be fired unless they commit serious faults or out of economic necessity.

The trade union delegation of the enterprise is chosen out of candidates presented by the official unions. According to their ideological orientation, the Belgian labour movement is divided into the Confederation of Christian Trade Unions (ACV) and the socialist Belgian General Confederation of Labour (ABVV). The smaller, liberal trade union, the General Confederation of Liberal Syndicates (ACLVB) reassembles staff and highly qualified personnel. Elections for factory councils and committees of health and safety gave the following picture of their relative strength (17):

% of votes in	Factory Council			Committee of Health and Safety		
	ACV	ABVV	ACLVB	ACV	ABVV	ACLVB
1979.	50	42	8	49	43	8
1975.	48	46	6	48	45	6
1971.	45	49	6	47	47	6
1967.	43	51	6	44	50	6
1963.	44	51	5	44	50	5
1958.	41	55	4	41	54	4
1954.	37	59	4	NO ELECTIONS		
1950.	VOTES NOT PUBLISHED			NO ELECTIONS		

1.2. THE SECTORAL LEVEL

1.2.1. The sectoral council (bedrijfsraad)

Branch Council (bedrijfsraden) are the consultation organs competent for economic problems on the sectoral level. The 1948 act established this organ, in which employees and employers seat in parity to study the situation in the respective branch and to advise the authorities. Their duty is "to submit to the Minister, the Central Council of the Economy or to the Planbureau, on their own initiative or on request in, the form of a survey representing the different viewpoints, all advice or proposals concerning problems of their

branch" (18). These councils were created for the following branches: metals, textiles, clothing, construction, fishing, chemicals, food and leather (19).

Thus far, there is no council for important sectors as transport, finance, energy, agriculture and the like. In part, these gaps were filled by national organs and other committees (20).

1.2.2. The Joint Committees

Joint Committees form the organs on the sectoral level competent for social matters (21).

These committees have grown with the union force and their acceptance by the employers (22). The committees were legalized immediately after the Second World War, about 25 years after their appearance.

Joint committees are established by Royal Decree on request by or with consultation of organizations of employers and employees, and with the advice of the National Council of Work.

The law of 5/12/68 provides a new definition of the statutes of the joint committees and the collective agreements. Article 38 prescribes the tasks of the joint committees as follows:

1. conclude collective agreements (23);
2. anticipate or reconcile conflicts between employers and employees;
3. advise on request or on own initiative the Government, the National Council of Work, the Central Council of the Economy, the Sectoral Councils.

Contrary to the Central Council of the Economy and the Branch Councils, Joint Committees can take decisions that in case of unanimity are binding for the branch (if they are confirmed by Royal Decree).

Joint committees are very active in the field of wages and work conditions (24).

1.3. THE NATIONAL LEVEL

1.3.1. The Central Council of the Economy (Centrale Raad voor het Bedrijfsleven)

This is the third panel of the 1948 act of the consultation framework on economic matters. The council on the basis of parity between employers and employees is completed by experts. It advises the authorities on problems concerning the national economy and economic policy, especially planning. This advice can be unanimous or not.

1.3.2. The National Board of Labour (Nationale Arbeidsraad)

Established by the law of 25/5/52 with competence on social matters of general importance (social legislation, labour and em-

ployment conventions, pensions). By the law of 5/12/68, the National Board of Labour was given the right to conclude collective agreements. Advice is often transformed into bills and laws (25).

1.3.3. *The National Joint Committee* (Nationaal Paritair Komitee)

National equivalent of the sectoral and regional joint committees. In fact, real negotiations take place in these organs between employers and employees. For important economy-wide decisions (f. i. wages), the parties try to reach an agreement on the national level. When this is not successful, the government tries to mediate. When, however, no intersectoral agreement can be established (as in recent years), negotiations pass to joint committees of lower levels.

1.3.4. *Other National Consultation Bodies*

There exist a lot of other consultation bodies (though the representation of the employees is not always in parity). We only present 3 (26);

1.3.4.1. *The National Committee for Economic Expansion*

This Committee brings together representatives of the government, the employers and the trade unions to consult on economic expansion and full employment; it seeks measures to be taken by the government or other promoters of economic life. It gives advice concerning the plan.

1.3.4.2. *The Social and Economic Conference*

It brings together the same agents, but it is seen more as an occasion to bring into the open general principles and intentions on economic and social matters (27).

1.3.4.3. *The National Labour Conference* (Nationale Arbeidskonferentie)

This conference was held as early as 1936 to reconcile social partners. After 1948, when the consultation framework was instituted, its sessions were rare and then substituted by the Social and Economic Conference.

In these conferences, especially until 1954, important social assets were won by the workers. However, in recent years the economic crisis was in focus (28). The last conference (29) was held in November 1980 joining workers, employers, government and other social groups to discuss how the economy could be stimulated and how to curb state deficit, especially in health and social insurance. Partners could

not agree about methods to attain the goals, and no central agreement could be concluded. Consequently, the government felt obliged to order an income-stop by law (approved by the national parliament).

14. REGIONAL BODIES AND THE PLANNING

1.4.1. *Regionalization*

On 1/10/1980, the most recent phase of the regionalization came into operation as a result of the revision of some articles of the constitution and the promulgation of two laws on this matter on 15/8/1980.

It confirmed the existence of three language-communities with great cultural and other minor competencies: the Flemish, the French and the German communities. It definitely introduced three regions: Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels. The regions have their own councils and executives with competence for regional economic matters. So national government is completed by regional government. It also implies that some of the concertation network was decentralized; f.e., the Flemish part also now has its Flemish Economic and Social Concertation Committee with a strict regional competence. The reform is still in process (some organs of the German community have not yet been created). Moreover, it's only provisional as the statute of Brussels has not been settled yet. This difficult political issue should be settled before the communal elections of 1982 (30).

1.4.2. *Planning*

On 15/7/1970, a general law on the organization of planning and economic decentralization was voted (31). The Planbureau (32) drafts a yearly, revisable five-year plan after consultation with a number of economic advice organs. This plan has an imperative character for the government, a contractual character for the enterprise receiving state aid, and is indicative for the other enterprises (33).

The Planbureau has three directions: a general, a sectoral and a regional direction. The first two make an inventory of the possible alternatives and priorities. This is confronted by the regional directions (respectively Flemish, Wallon and Brabantine) with the advice of the respective Regional Economic Councils. These councils contain 1/4 of trade union representatives, 2/4 members of parliament and the provincial direction of the region, and 1/4 delegates of employers' organizations.

The Planbureau then formulates a draft of the plan for the government. This is presented to parliament together with the advices of the highest social and economic consultation organs. The Committee for Economic Expansion and the Regional Economic Councils are consulted once more before parliament gives the plan force of law (34).

So far, no five year-plan has been passed by parliament (35). The Government Declaration of the Flemish Executive contained the intention to revise the law on planning of 15/7/1970. It foresees the creation of an autonomous Flemish Planbureau competent for regional planning (36).

2. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CONSULTATION SYSTEM

The following criticism can be formulated (37):

1. The stipulations of the system as such are not always very strictly respected.

For instance, an inquiry in the steel sector revealed that only a little more than half the enterprise heads gave the information they were requested to give in the factory council by the Royal Decree of 27/11/1973 (38).

2. Despite parity, union members do not feel in an equal position as they lack a lot of information and as the enterprise head has the experts under his control (39).

3. Moreover, decision-making in the factory council requires unanimity so that one member has, in fact, a veto right.

4. In the whole consultation system, most organs have only an advisory function. The system is not sufficiently embodied in the total legislature system. There is not enough control over the execution of decisions.

5. Most important, economic and major financial decisions remain out of the scope of the consultation bodies. In fact, employees have only some influence on the social impact of the economic and financial decisions.

6. There is a cutting up of competences and a multiplicity of organs, so that the boundaries of competence remain unclear and decision-making complex and obscure.

7. Due to compartmentalization of the labour movement, workers' representatives on several occasions do not act as one front.

8. Due to the difference of interests, the consultation system was not able to develop as a dominant system. There has been a permanent lack of confidence between employers and some more radical trade union wings (40). In fact, the whole operation of the consultation system set up by the law of 1948 seems to be dependent on the climate in other organs. Real negotiations on important social decisions have taken place in the Joint Committees. Employers prefer to build up their own organizations (41).

9. The problem should be mentioned to what extent official trade unions really represent the interests of the workers. Overly close integration in the consultation system, together with the links of the unions with political parties, could give them an alienated position in the power structure. One could defend that, in fact, the unions have contributed to the guarantee of social peace and preservation of the existing system (42). On the other hand, unions highly criticized the existing consultation system.

3. THE IDEOLOGICAL VIEWPOINTS OF THE UNIONS ON PARTICIPATION AND REFORM OF SOCIETY

3.1. THE ABVV

The Belgian General Confederation of Labour (ABVV) on principle rejects codetermination and speaks in favour of worker control (ABVV-Congress, April 1975) (43). It refuses the responsibility for the management of a social system it rejects. It aims at the realization of a democratic-socialist society; this means socialization of property and socialization of management in the context of a planned-economy. The transformation of capitalist society happens through democratically-realized structural reforms. Therefore, at the moment, worker control on each level is requested (and not management in the capitalist context) to inform, educate and prepare workers. In the enterprise, the priority is given to the building up of a strong trade union delegation that contests autonomously the authority of the heads of the factory. Factory council and committees may remain, but only to receive information and to extend control (44).

3.2. THE ACV

The ACV programme departs from the proposition that the present enterprise and organizational structure lead to alienation of the workers. This alienation is reinforced by publicity and a dominant bourgeois cultural pattern. It urges workers to 'sell' human values and to integrate themselves in the system. On the other hand, the ACV (45) wishes that the workers as an entity should give their full contribution to the society, socially, culturally and economically (46).

In the end, this can only be realized in an economic democracy with self-management. This ideal can only be reached step by step. Such steps are:

- a. the amelioration of the right to information;
- b. consultation on the work organization;
- c. reform of the law on property and financial partnership; the constitution of a control council is proposed, deciding on the critical points in the life of the enterprise; the control council should be composed of capital suppliers (at the moment, the board of shareholders), of workers of the enterprise, and of representatives of general interest;
- d. installment of a workers' council; in contrast to the existing factory council, here only delegates of the workers sit (47). In this way, the viewpoints of the workers can be expressed better and brought into the outside world (The present 'compromising' advice of the factory council is sometimes confusing to the workers); The head of the enterprise remains obliged to give information on economic and financial matters every three

months. The competence of the workers' council is further seen analogous to that of the existent factory council (advice right, information right, decision and control right in social matters).

A veto right for some decisions is also requested. Conflicts with the head of factory are regulated by an internal reconciliation procedure, or by an external agent when agreement is not reached.

It follows that this union is far more pragmatic (48).

The viewpoint is also closer to the propositions made by the juridical commission of the European Parliament on the so-called Fifth Direction concerning the reform of the law on partnership, and to the similar conception of participation bodies in practice in the Netherlands and in Germany (49).

It is of some importance to point out that the socialist union has the majority in the Walloon region and the Christian Union in the Flemish part. Further achievements could depend on the global political situation and differ for the two regions.

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FOOTNOTES

(1) During the resistance, contacts between employees and employers led to an agreement on social solidarity and the lines of participation after the war. National Work Conferences were held in 1944, 1946, 1947 and 1948, when the participation system was institutionalized by the law of 20/9/48.

See: HET VBN Waaron. Vijfentwintigste jaarverslag van het VBN, 1971, pp 95—96. For the law of 20/9/48, see Belgisch Staatsblad 27—28/9/49. Reproduced as 'Bijlage III', Kiesverrichtingen voor de ondernemingsraden en de comités voor veiligheid en gezondheid. Brussels, ABVV, 1971, pp 85—95.

(2) The regulations of the law changed continuously. Some more important issues in the seventies include the extension of the advice and information right on economic matters, especially on employment and personnel policy of the enterprise.

See: ACV-Vakbeweging, Brussels, 10/9/77, pp. 57.

Vademecum Ondernemingsraden, Brussels, ABVV, pp. 127—135.

(3) Section 14, *ibid*.

(4) Public services with the state as employer have specific regulations.

(5) The early decree on the execution of the law — aiming at gradual introduction of this stipulation — prescribed a norm of 150 people. A decree of 11/10/78 brought this back to 100 (Belgisch Staatsblad 31/10/78). This stipulation is still in order.

See: Bijlage II, Kiesverrichtingen '79. Komitees voor veiligheid en gezondheid. Ondernemingsraden, Brussels, ABVV, p 8).

(6) A technical exploitation entity:

a) has to possess some degree of economic autonomy or

b) has to be a social entity.

In these enterprises, joint sessions are possible for all or some councils. Besides, with consentment of the general council, it is possible to organize sections with limited competence functioning as preparatory commissions.

See: Article 17 of the law of 20/9/48, o. c., p. 87

Arbeiderscontrole en Ondernemingsraad, ABVV, Brussels, pp. 11—12.

(7) Workers of foreign nationality, employed according to the law, participate in these elections.

Loon naar werken. Sociale verkiezingen. Begeleidingsbrochure van het ABVV bij de TV-reeks over arbeidsproblemen. Vormingsinstituut, ABVV, Brussels, p. 3.

(8) According Art. 16 of the law of 20/9/48, the number of members of the factory council varies from 2 to 25, and depends on the size of the firm. Practically, the following norms were set:

4	members in an enterprise with less than 101 employed	"
8	" " " " 500—1000	"
2	" more for every 1000	"
20	60001—80001	"
22	more than 8000	"

This can be brought to 25 by unanimous support of unions and head of enterprise.

(9) In principle, they cannot be fired except because of serious faults or economic circumstances. In practice, a crisis situation seems to induce employers to use the clause of the serious faults to get rid of strong union men. Several cases proceed now before the law courts.

(10) Art. 22 § 1 van de Wet van 20/9/48, *ibid*.

(11) See: Art. 15 Wet 20/9/48.

Arbeiderscontrole en ondernemingsraad, ABVV, pp. 18—20

ACV-Vakbeweging 10/9/77, pp. 57—59.

Here general information on the competence of the factory council is given.

The information to be given by the enterprise head was extended by Royal Decree of 27/11/1973.

See: Vademecum ondernemingsraden, ABVV, Brussels, pp. 131—135.

(12) Article 30 of this Royal Decree contains the stipulation about the quality of the information. O. c., p. 134.

(13) Some classes of workers have the right to take leave from work for general and trade union education.

(14) As using the language of the region for the internal relations in the enterprise.

(15) Some authors consider this giving of more power to the official trade unions as a protective reaction against more radical groups. The quotations in the text point also in this direction.

This interpretation is cited in: Garson, G. Recent Developments in Workers Participation in Europe. Self Management: Economic liberation of Man. (ed. J. Vanek). Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1975, p. 177.

For a description of the rather passive role of the unions before this reform, see: Bracke, J. Vakbonden onder druk: de jaren 70—73 opnieuw belicht. In: Tijdschrift voor Sociale Wetenschappen, 1978, nr 2, pp 135—165.

For this evolution, see also: Arbeiderscontrole en syndicale afvaardiging. ABVV, Brussels, pp. 4—6.

(16) C. A. O. no 5: see: Bijlage I, Arbeiderscontrole en syndicale afvaardiging, o. c., p. 48.

(17) Nawerking sociale verkiezingen '79. Officiële volledige uitslagen Volksmacht. Weekblad van de christelijke arbeidersbeweging. 28/4/79., p. 7.

(18) ACV-Vakbeweging 10/9/77, p. 50.

See also: Law of 20/9/1948, sektion II, art. 6—10.

(19) *Ibid*.

(20) For example, by commissions of the Central Council of the Economy (Commission for agriculture, construction), Committee for Distribution, Board of Energy, Directorium of the Coalmines, Steel Committee, Gas and Electricity Board, Insurance Committee, e. a.

(21) There exist also joint committees on other levels, f. i. national and regional committees.

(22) ACV-Vakbeweging 10/9/77, p. 51.

(23) The law of December 1968 on the Joint Committees and the Collective Agreements defines the last as follows:

"A collective agreement is a convention concluded between one or more organizations representing employers and one or more organizations representing employees and wherein the individual or collective relations between employer and employee in an enterprise or a branch are regulated, as well as the rights and duties of the contracting parties.

(24) ACV-Vakbeweging, 10/9/77, p. 52.

(25) For Central Council of the Economy and National Board of Labour, see: AVC-Vakbeweging, 10/9/77, pp. 48-49.

(26) Other organs with more or less consultation function include: Economic: Price Commission, Index Commission, Consumption Board, Social: National Council of Security and Health, governing bodies of social insurance institutions, a.o. Financial: Council of Regents of the National Bank, High Financial Council, Governing bodies of public credit institutions, The Rediscount and Guarantee Institute, a.o. See: Outrive, L. Van. Sociaal-ekonomische Machtstructuren in België. In: Machtsgroepen in de Samenleving, Leuven, Davidsfonds, 1973, p. 47 e.v.

(27) Ibid., p. 50.

(28) De N.A.K. in plaats van de revolutie. In: Vooruit-De Morgen, 17. 11. 80, p. 4.

(29) See: De Werker, ABVV, 22. 11. 80, pp. 1, 6, 7.

De Tribune, ACOD, november 1980, p. 6.

(30) Ruys, M. Vlaanderen en Wallonië. Experimenten met zelfbestuur. In: De Standaard, 6. 10. 80, p. 6.

Regeerakkoord. De Morgen, 17. 10. 80; p. 19.

Regeerakkoord voor de Vlaamse Executieve. De Morgen, 15. 10. 80, p. 7.

(31) Outrive, L., o. c., p. 50.

(32) In 1959 a Bureau for Economic Programming was founded.

(33) ACV-Vakbeweging, o. c., p. 47.

(34) Outrive, L., o. c., p. 51.

(35) Debunne, G. Planning? De Werker, ABVV, 15/11/80, p. 1.

(36) Regeerakkoord voor de Vlaamse Executieve, De Morgen, 15. 10. 80, p. 7.

(37) Some basic criticisms are found in Outrive, L. Vab, o. c. General criticism is given by study bureaus of trade unions. L. Remouchamps argues that one unique formula of participation cannot solve different problems.

Remouchamps, L. Arbeidersmedezeggenschap. In: Tijdschrift voor sociale wetenschappen, 1972, n° 3, pp. 317-323.

(38) Kongres 79. Ondernemingsraad: een enquête, enige ideeën.

Centrale der Metaalbewerkeren ABVV, p. 15.

(39) Interview with trade unionists of ABVV and ACV.

(40) See f.e.: Na de UNIOP-enquête over participatie. Wat zij er van denken. In: Impact, mei 77, pp. 59-74.

(41) For the viewpoint of the trade unions, see the next section.

(42) Garson, D, o. c.

(43) Arbeiderscontrole en ondernemingsraad. ABVV, Brussels, pp. 21-40. Batselier, N. De Arbeiderscontrole, een eis van het ABVV, 1976, pp. 34-36.

(44) See: Sociale Konflikten. Loon naar werken.

ABVV, Brussel, Deel 4., p. 14 e. v.

(45) CCMB. De democratisering van de onderneming. Zelfbestuur.

The ACW (Algemene Cristelijke Werkliedenbond) is a radical section of the ACV.

(46) Van ondernemingsraad naar werknemersraad. Buitengewoon ACV-kongres, Brussel, 16 maart 1974. Inleiding en Goedgekeurde tekst. Brussels, ACV.

(47) Ibid.

(48) For the viewpoint of the liberal trade union (ACLVB), see:

Verhofstadt, M. De houding van de Algemene Centrale der Liberale Vakbonden van België ten opzichte van de medezeggenschap in de onderneming. In: Stroobant, M. De medezeggenschap van de werknemer in de onderneming. Gent, Story, 1969.

The viewpoint of the employers is illustrated by the interviews of the President of the Union of the Belgian Enterprises and two managers of big enterprises, in Na de UNIOP-enquête, o. c.

(49) Henckens, J. De Europese "Mitbestimmung": meepraten met of zonder medeverantwoordelijkheid?. De Standaard, 7. 1. 81, p. 3.

STRUKTURE PARTICIPACIJE U BELGIJSKOJ PRIVREDI

J. LAURENS, W. LAURENS i R. STALLAERTS

Re z i m e

U članku su opisane i evaluirane strukture participacije u belgijskoj privredi, kreirane i izgrađene posle Drugog svetskog rata. Najveća pažnja je posvećena strukturama na mikro-nivou, tj. telima koja teže participaciji u preduzeću: savetu, komitetu za bezbednost i zdravlje i sindikalnoj delegaciji. Zatim su opisani oblici participacije u sektorskim i nacionalnim organima, kao i participacija radnika u regionalnim planskim telima. Prikazana su, potom, i ograničenja kao i nedostaci struktura participacije. Na kraju su izloženi pogledi sindikata na problem participacije i reforme društva u kratkom i dugom roku.