

ne, pošto profiti po pravilu pripadaju preduzeću (i, otuda, radnicima preduzeća), monopolističke deformacije neizbežne u pravim tržišnim uslovima vode prisvajanju neradnog dohotka od strane članova pojedinih preduzeća, kao i suprotnom slučaju kada ostali radni kolektivi ne mogu da zaštite plodove svoga rada.

Drugi model, koji predstavlja neku vrstu tržišno orijentisanih reformi zapaženih u Istočnoj Evropi posle 1965. godine, stvara iste odnose u raspodeli između preduzeća kao prvi model plus antagonističke odnose u raspodeli unutar preduzeća. Ova druga osobina potiče od tretiranja profita kao nagrade za rukovođenje (što važi i za samoupravni model) i od činjenice da je rukovođenje specijalizovani zadatak direktora i tehničko-administrativnih kadrova kao faktora udaljenih od radnika (što ne važi za samoupravni model). Otuda profiti po pravilu pripadaju preduzeću ili, pre, rukovodećim kadrovima. Osnovna pravila i mehanizmi robne proizvodnje omogućavaju rukovodstvu da utiče na veličinu fonda nadnica u preduzeću; na taj su način nadnice pretvorene u kategoriju koju treba minimizirati, što vodi suparničkom odnosu između nadnica i profita (a otuda i antagonističkim odnosima u raspodeli) unutar preduzeća.

Oba modela dozvoljavaju transformaciju tržišnih kategorija, posebno profita, u kategorije raspodele. Stoga oni stvaraju objektivnu situaciju u kojoj lični dohodi sistematski ne odražavaju doprinose pojedina ukupnom društvenom radu. Ova situacija protivreči osnovnom socijalističkom principu: »raspodeli prema radu«; u tom je pogledu drugi model nazadniji nego prvi model.

Treći model predstavlja pokušaj nalaženja odgovora na pitanje: šta treba učiniti da robna proizvodnja ne bi potkopala fundamentalne odnose u socijalizmu? Robna proizvodnja iziskuje proizvodnju za profit. Otuda se profiti mogu smatrati glavnim indikatorom uspeha svakog preduzeća; međutim, nema potrebe da se preduzeće (njegovo rukovodstvo ili njegovi radnici) nagradi pomoću raspodele profita. Po socijalističkom principu koji predstavlja postojanje »tačnog« merila za nadnice i plate, plate rukovodećih kadrova treba da odraze doprinos posebne vrste rada društvenom bogatstvu. Zahtevani radni doprinos direktora, na primer, ostvaruje se u »dobrom rukovođenju« koje može da se meri (ali samo meri) profitom; otuda direktor koji maksimizira profit ima pravo na platu kao naknadu za dobro obavljene posao. Ponašanje koje se očekuje od »crvenog direktora« ne zahteva, kao dodatni podsticaj, stvarno učešće direktora u raspodeli profita.

Može da se završi time da je robna proizvodnja spojiva sa socijalizmom ako, i samo ako su odnosi (i principi) raspodele odvojeni od tržišnih procesa.

## THE EMERGENCE OF ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES\*

Warner WOODWORTH\*\*

While considerable research has reported on the emergence of worker controlled business firms in Europe and Latin America, little has appeared in the literature regarding such occurrences in the United States.

The present paper attempts to address this deficiency by reflecting upon historical and current conditions in North America which are giving rise to a cooperative and labor-managed movement in the U. S. After summarizing forces leading toward self-management, a discussion will portray several recent developments which show promise of an expanding worker-owned economy, and the problems and prospects of a third sector are highlighted.

### FORCES FOR CHANGE

The idea of grassroots economic participation is not totally new in America. The early ventures of the Penny Capitalists, the utopian ideals of Robert Owen, and the cooperative society of the Rochdale pioneers were all British in nature, but these early efforts seeded a certain U. S. philosophical propensity toward collaborative economics.

Specifically, the consumers' cooperative movement with its interest in serving needs, not exploiting the market, is strong in the U. S. today. These institutions can be characterized as being under the control of the users of a product or service. Currently, some 50 million Americans belong to co-ops which are owned, capitalized, and controlled by their members to varying degrees. The largest are agricultural co-ops which in 1975 sold \$ 57 billion worth of supplies and food. Other alternative businesses include thousands of housing and food co-ops, and credit unions consist of 30 million members, holding assets valued at \$37 billion.

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On the other hand, worker co-ops, in which members are employed in the production of goods, are few and far between in contemporary America. Yet there are elements of historical precedent woven into the fabric of today's large-scale corporate monoliths. Ellerman (1979) traces the evolution of union-owned worker co-ops among iron molders in Boston during the mid 1850's. These were designed to transform workers into becoming their "own masters" by abolishing the wage system. Early religious groups, such as the Mormons, established rather intricate networks of cooperative production in the West. And around the turn of the century various worker-managed firms existed in such industries as printing, cabinet-making, tailoring, and glass work. These worker-owned structures were, in certain respects, the logical outgrowth of a cluster of early American values—collective action for survival, small economies of scale, being one's own boss, participation in the economic system, a strong work ethic, and the ideology of sharing the opportunity to work and, likewise, the fruits of one's labor.

These historical forces for the inception of worker ownership may be juxtaposed against an interesting set of phenomena in today's capitalist America. The brief list below provides a simple sketch of a growing economic crisis as the U. S. enters the 1980's:

- Unemployment growing at almost three-quarters of a million workers a month in the past several months (the highest since the Depression).
- Declining productivity resulting from an absentee, alienated work force, and dehumanized industrial sector.
- Bureaucratic rigor mortis which has threatened the collapse of major companies such as Lockheed and Chrysler, cities such as Cleveland and New York, and whole industries such as steel and rubber.
- Conglomerate expansion and corporate mergers to the record tune of \$49.5 billion in 1979, resulting in the concentration of sixty percent of all manufacturing assets in the tentacular hold of less than 200 corporations.
- Enormous profits for the powerful (Exxon made a 101 percent increase during this past quarter, a record \$1.92 billion) while inflation, soaring interest rates, and government ceilings on wage increases erode the incomes of the average person.
- Runaway shops have brought about general job loss, community economic decline, and dwindling tax bases in hundreds of cities (with accompanying reduction of local government services at the point when those services are so critically important).

These conditions, coupled with the previously discussed historical roots of American values, have been instrumental in creating a resurgence of demands to decentralize present monopolistic capitalism, redistribute wealth, and democratize social and economic structures. Of particular significance, is the growing interest in transforming traditionally structured and owned companies into alternative, worker-managed enterprises.

## CORPORATE FLIGHT

Much of the impetus for this worker-owned development comes from the devastating industrial decline which is increasingly manifest in the Northeast and industrial Midwest of the nation. During the 1970's these "frost belt" states witnessed the erosion of 1.5 million jobs, some 13 percent of all manufacturing production. A government study of this geographic pattern over five years (1969-74) shows that business closings were double that of births in the North, while in the South new firms were started at twice the Northern rate. Plants were shut down because of bankruptcy, new markets in the sunbelt, cheap labor overseas, and a generalized effort to trim corporate fat. For every new non-agricultural job created in the Northeast and Central states between 1970 and 1977, the South and West picked up three. Population increases of those growth states is triple the older regions, with growth areas enjoying substantially higher gains in real personal income per capita. Particularly hard-hit have been states like Massachusetts where 563 plants were closed in a single year. Likewise, during the first quarter of 1979 Ohio lost 13,000 jobs to industrial dislocation. And the state of New York, which has made up approximately 13 percent of the total U. S. labor force, has lost so many jobs that it currently employs only eight percent.

## PLANT CLOSINGS: PATHOS OR PROMISE?

Traditionally, workers and communities faced with the prospect of industrial shutdowns have responded rather passively to the fate decreed by absentee owners and mammoth conglomerates. Usually the process is one of gradual erosion of profits, accompanied by growing stockholder dissatisfaction. Operating costs are cut, and the result is often a deterioration of plant facilities, aging of equipment, and general reluctance to make capital investments needed to remain competitive. Eventually a decision is arrived at to shut down the operation.

The consequence is usually paralysis and disbelief on the part of employees and considerable pain to surrounding communities. Job loss to workers is accompanied by psychological, and often physical, strain and stress. Families may be uprooted as workers attempt to relocate in better job markets. The local community often suffers economic stagnation of staggering proportions, characterized by the simultaneous shutdown of businesses dependent on the now-closed industrial operation and an eroded tax base. The increased demand for social services and unemployment claims add significant pressures for costly governmental response.

Instead of reverting to the reactive, habitual responses of the past, today's worker is taking the bull by the horns—becoming proactive in taking over closed-up businesses. Thus, a cooperative press thrives in Massachusetts, while a group of unemployed Muslims in Cleveland are starting up a \$10 million poultry co-op. When 350 female garment workers lost their jobs in a plant shutdown in Utah they coalesced to start

up a sewing cooperative. In Youngstown, Ohio, the community and workers of U. S. Steel are attempting to convert their shut down facilities to joint ownership of a \$50 million organization. And in Washington, D. C., there is now a five company federation of white-collar employees that elect their own management.

### CONVERSION TO WORKER OWNERSHIP

What can union leaders do when their plant has closed down and workers are without jobs? One unique answer to such a question is to make them vice presidents of an executive board and open up the company under worker ownership. This is precisely what has happened at a glass factory in Pennsylvania after the company was shut down a year ago. Today, the President of Local 21, Glass and Ceramic Workers, is Vice President of Personnel for the Jeanette Sheet Glass Corporation. Last year he was a watchman. And the corporation's Vice President of Quality Assurance and Transportation had been a glass cutter and President of Local 108.

Together with a Vice President of Finance (who had been an auditor with the company) and an outside attorney, now Vice President for Legal Affairs, these new officers and their president are engaged in an intriguing challenge facing thousands of U. S. workers as they become victims of plant closing. Bright, committed, and creative, the four have succeeded in countering the agony of failure by designing a workers' stock plan, generating funds, bringing an outsider in as the new president, and incorporating as an employee-owned company.

Situated on top of a wooded hill in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania is the old ASG glass factory. Antiquated, boarded up buildings suggest that the days of a vibrant, productive past in which busy workers turned out sheets of window glass are long gone. The reality is that ASG corporate offices closed the 34-acre facility down in late 1978 turning 343 workers out on the street without warning and without hope.

Employees wept openly as they saw their life's work and accompanying retirement funds disappear in the aftermath of the shutdown. Shock and disbelief combined with pain and anger as workers considered what could be done. The only choice seemed to be unemployment checks or part-time work at minimum wages in small area businesses. Hardly choices at all, such options seemed more like a forced last resort.

But another alternative began to be considered as the sense of desperation grew. Instead of lying down to die, why not take the plant over as workers? What began as a radical idea became a serious proposal and people began to act. Leaders of the glass cutters union joined forces with a local attorney and several managers, formed themselves into a committee, and began to search for support for their ideas.

ASG headquarters in Tennessee had declared that the closing was due to obsolete equipment and the fact that a large tank in the factory was too costly to repair. New "float" technologies in more modern plants were said to out-produce the old tank system for manufacturing sheet glass. The perception of the workers was different, however. They

knew Jeanette had a good reputation, one of highly skilled craftsmen making some of the best glass in the U. S. The company had produced solid dollar results (\$15—\$19 million annually) and had never gone in the red. So union funds were channeled into a feasibility study by a consulting firm to determine if reopening the scuttled plant under worker management was a viable alternative.

It took a year to assess the alternatives, draw up an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP), generate funds, and get the gates open again—from December 1978 to December 1979. The interim period was one of hardship for workers and their families, with six months unemployment benefits, odd jobs, and subsistence union funds with which to etch out an existence.

While considerable support was given by many in the surrounding Pennsylvania area, others did not come forth with offers of good will. For instance, the International Glass and Ceramic Workers, AFL-CIO, viewed the idea of a workers' takeover as preposterous and wanted nothing to do with it. The consequence of this is that the three locals which had existed previously in the plant (and fought considerably over jurisdictional disputes) have now banded together and disaffiliated with the larger union structure.

The town of Jeanette had no financial resources itself to support such a venture, but city officials fought for the workers' interests at the state and federal level. Regional politicians of both parties united on the cause of the glass factory, and media coverage built a growing base of public interest. The governor's office provided technical assistance funding to plan for reopening, and the services of an attorney and financial expert were of critical importance to the project. Local efforts were fused together with an area bank and federal support in Washington to nail the deal down.

The final arrangement consisted of a \$6 million package of interlocking agreements between regional industrial development authorities, local banks, and at the national level, the Economic Development Administration (EDA). Workers themselves each bought \$2,000 worth of stock at \$100 per share. The participation of some 343 employees resulted in almost \$700,000 as down payment for purchase of the plant. An employee stock ownership plan was formulated, and is administered by the bank as a trust. Only stockholders are eligible to work at the Jeanette factory. The bank loaned the company \$2.8 million to repair the tank, complete other necessary renovations, and to start up with working capital. EDA guaranteed that loan, the first of its kind EDA has guaranteed to a plant already closed.

In the transformation to worker ownership, the three unions co-existing in the plant have merged together informally, and employees in different departments of the plant elect representatives to serve on a plant-wide union committee, along with electing a secretary and treasurer voted on by all. The two ex-union presidents who are now vice presidents of the corporation serve as permanent members of the union committee also. The result is a dual decision structure, union committee and traditional management, with two participants sitting in both arenas. The hope is that joint membership by the two will faci-

litate cooperative problem-solving and respond to the mutual interests of all parties in this worker-owned venture.

Will the plan work? Employees are confident it will. A five year contract with General Glass Importers has been agreed upon. This ensures that 85 percent of the plant's projected annual glass production of 110 million square feet has a buyer. Workers expect to do about \$20 million of sales a year. If projections are correct, it will take only five years to pay off all the debts and fully own the company. By then the original \$2,000 in stock purchases by each employee will be worth approximately \$23,000.

In late 1979, the gates of the old plant were opened for the first time in a year. Of 343 original employees, 129 were called back to prepare for the start up—repairing and heating up the tank. Within two months Jeanette started drawing glass again. As one worker put it on the first morning back, "We now own the company store!" For local workers, the employee-ownership plan means their own survival. Some see their experiment having ramifications beyond Jeanette—as a prototype for steel plants being shut down throughout the United States.

Whether or not Jeanette will be successful under employee-ownership is still a debatable question. So is the criteria of success. Under traditional capitalistic assumptions, the primary economic values are those of maximizing profits and obtaining a high return on investment. In the case of Jeanette Sheet Glass, workers/owners emphasize that job retention is the major objective. What is needed, therefore, is only a sufficient income which allows the firm to purchase necessary equipment, pay outside vendors, and meet the company payroll. A high profit margin, insisted upon in the traditional firm, is not essential for the survival goals of Jeanette. This being the case, there is a considerable likelihood that these glassworkers will survive.

#### WORKER/COMMUNITY RESURGENCE

Perhaps the most important illustration of the movement to worker-ownership in the United States currently is the case of Rath Packing Company in Waterloo, Iowa. After a century of producing name-brand ham, bacon, and wieners in its aging plant, the company moved toward the verge of collapse in mid 1970.

New competitors with large infusions of capital for new technology began to wage economic war with Rath's market position. Unable to generate the financial means to modernize, the company began to reduce operations and lay off workers—a pattern which over the years cut Rath's workforce from 5,000 to less than 2,000 hourly employees today. During the last five years the company experienced heavy losses and severe cash flow problems, in spite of \$300 million in sales.

Eventually, in 1978 Rath's precarious financial situation became public as local banks rejected requests for additional loans. The threat of a shutdown sent shock waves throughout the city. Rath was the city's second largest employer and if closed, unemployment would double overnight. Community leaders, management, and the union

(United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 46) heatedly debated the demise of the company and its possible renewal. Consulting firms, bankers, and lawyers scurried around with proposals for attracting new investors, implementing a modernization plan, building a new facility, scuttling costly pension contributions, and reducing wages and benefits.

As the inevitability of massive job losses loomed large on the horizon, the union began to make possible concessions to keep the company afloat. However, instead of simply giving Rath financial breaks, leaders of Local 46 proposed that they purchase controlling interest through the issuance of 1.8 million shares of new stock. Soon this plan was ratified by union membership by a 20 to 1 majority. Rath stockholders and the board of directors approved the proposal in June of 1980 and a new era of industrial democracy was ushered into the United States.

#### CONTROLLING INTEREST

Among other features, the plan includes the following important aspects:

- A worker-appointed majority of the board of directors (10 out of 16 seats).
- Purchase of stock at \$2.00 per share which will culminate in union members ultimately owning 60 percent of the company.
- Guarantees that half of any pre-tax profits shall go to the workers to repay deferred wages, benefits, and past-due pension accounts.
- Establishment of a trust, made up of five employees, to administer the new plan and vote the employees stock as a block at annual stockholder meetings.
- Decision-making will be based on the cooperative assumption of one person-one vote, a significant departure from traditional U. S. ownership principles.
- A union-appointed accounting firm will have access to company records in order to annually audit the financial books at Rath.
- Local 46 agreed to defer cost of living increases and reduce sick pay and vacation coverage.
- The influx of additional capital for the workers would qualify Rath for a \$4.6 million loan from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), essential funds for modernization improvements.

Reaction to this precedent-setting plan of action by the workers at Rath has been a mixture of pro and con. Company managers seemed elated that the firm has a new lease on life. Some express confidence that the plan will work and that a new era of cooperation with the union may indeed be the path to a bright future. Others, more grim-faced in their response, feel that the current developments are basically a necessary evil. A few are dead set against the proposal and see it as

the infringing of the union into the private sanctuary of management. One can only speculate how many managers at Rath may have updated their resumes in order to pursue other job options. Union leaders, while expressing dissatisfaction with the incompetence of a few managers, hope and need, at least for now, the continued contribution of most of the company's administrative staff to keep the business running.

Responses within the union have also been somewhat mixed. The international union basically viewed Local 46's proposal as the action of a few crazy mavericks who were going beyond the bounds of organized labor's traditional role. Clearly the local has had its own impetus for combatting the Rath shutdown. The international did not outright resist the effort, but provided no financial support. International union officials seem principally concerned about giving the company concessions and the possible implications such an agreement might have on other groups of workers around the nation.

Nor have the Waterloo workers themselves been unanimous in their response to the plan. When the idea of employee ownership was initially proposed by the president and chief steward, only four percent voted in opposition, a rather clear mandate of support. Later, a small group of workers claimed they had been misled and took the union leadership to court, seeking to block the \$20.00 a week deductions from their paychecks. Most workers, however, seem to feel a combination of curiosity in their new roles as owners with cautious optimism. The full meaning of how it will all work is not yet clear. A number do not expect the day-to-day experience of slaughtering hogs or smoking ham to be any different than the past. For a few, there are heightened expectations that they are embarking on a new venture in economic democracy. But the majority do not articulate a visionary commitment to worker control as an ideology. Rather, there is the pragmatic concern for jobs and economic survival.

#### PARTICIPATIVE STRUCTURES

The transition to worker-ownership has been characterized by a new climate of trust between the union and the Rath Packing Company. A primary vehicle for achieving this new relationship has been the establishing of a top Labor/Management Committee (LMC). With equal representation from upper management and the union's bargaining committee, this group of ten people is the means of engaging in cooperative problem-solving. A jointly agreed upon charter calls for the leadership to be equitably divided between two co-chairmen, one each from labor and management.

The LMC's mission is defined as insuring that quality, productivity, and profits be pursued with the assurance of secure employment and the economic rewards which should follow as fruits of one's labor. A climate of dignity and opportunities for personal growth are assumed as essential elements to improving the quality of working life at Rath. And the committee has agreed that a fundamental tenet is now operable in all areas of the company—namely, that shop level employees "should

be involved in planning, analysis and design of change and improvement."

Monthly meetings of this bilateral group are held to set goals, identify priorities, plan action steps, evaluate data, and direct wide-spread activities designed to revitalize the ailing firm. Actual organizational improvements are carried out by Action Research Teams (ART) formed by the LMC to address specific issues. Labor, management, and staff expertise is pooled in these ad hoc teams in order to maximize the mix of knowledge and experience, combine it with fresh, new ideas from the shop floor perspective, and cooperatively plan and carry out the resolution of various problems facing the company. As a given project is successfully concluded, the ART is disbanded or reformulated to address other tasks.


Although still in its inception, the LMC structure shows promise as a participative instrument for increasing organizational effectiveness. For instance, an ART was formed to study the feasibility of Rath extending into an entire new product line, fresh packaged pork. Hourly employees met with managers and sales personnel to consider the viability of this new venture. Their mission successfully concluded with designing the new department from scratch, researching and evaluating possible equipment and machinery, determining the best location for the new operation in the plant, deciding start-up levels of production, and planning the manpower and skills training needs for employees who will work in this new area.

In a similar vein, worker "communication cells" have been set up to build a more open and comprehensive sharing of information throughout the plant. Shop stewards and foremen are working collaboratively to address critical concerns in a given area. In the kill area, for example, costly absenteeism has been reduced through such efforts. In the sliced bacon department serious problems of low productivity and yields were addressed by tapping the talents of the people assigned to that operation. After several months productivity improved 113 percent as a result of intensive thirty minute meetings on a regular basis. From this experimental beginning, the seeds of mass worker participation have been sown.

The emerging structure of parallel and joint decision-making at Rath now looks like the diagram on page 216.

#### CONCLUSION

Whether such ventures as the worker buy-out at Jeanette Sheet Glass and the take-over at Rath Packing Company portend a new wave of a participatory effort in the United States remains to be seen. Critics would argue that alternative structures cannot survive in a traditionally capitalist environment without being suffocated to death. Other advocates of leftist ideological persuasion hail these recent developments as the dawning of a new age of working class consciousness and the dismantling of the establishment.



At this point in time, perhaps the most conclusive interpretation to developments such as these is that U.S. workers are no longer passively accepting industrial decline from a position of victimization. Unions are protesting such actions with increasing aggressiveness. Legislation to control runaway factories is being proposed at the regional and national levels. And the incidence of worker-ownership as a strategy for reducing threatened unemployment and community disintegration is increasing. This struggle, at least for the present, tends to be articulated by the rank and file, not in terms of ideological rhetoric but a pragmatic concern for survival. If financial control and workplace democracy are the means to job security, then the pyramids of power and wealth may be dismantled. The major objective, thus far, is sheer economic survival.

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POJAVA EKONOMSKE DEMOKRATIJE U SAD

Warner WOODWORTH

Rezime

Dok se s jedne strane pojavio veliki broj studija koje se odnose na razvoj forme organizacija kojima rukovode radnici u Evropi i Latinskoj Americi, malo radova se pojavilo o takvim iskustvima u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama.

Ovaj članak pokušava da ublaži taj nedostatak, razmatranjem faktora koji su doveli do razvoja kooperativnih pokreta u američkoj istoriji. Radničko vlasništvo predstavlja logički produžetak jednog broja ranih i tipično američkih vrednosti: kolektivne akcije, malih preduzeća, želje da se bude »sam sebi šef«, učešća u društveno-ekonomskom sistemu, snažne radne etike i ideologije prava na rad i plodove sopstvenog rada. Istorijske snage koje su zaslužne za pojavu pokreta radničkih kooperativa su zatim upoređene sa grupom faktora kojima se odlikuje današnja kapitalistička Amerika: koncentracija vlasti u rukama velikih kompanija, birokratska rigidnost, nejednakost, inflacija i pogoršanje tržišta, retkost resursi i zatvaranje industrijskih preduzeća.

Ovakvo stanje današnjeg društva svakako je od presudne važnosti za objašnjenje ponovnog oživljavanja ranijih vrednosti koje teže za decentralizacijom vlasti, preraspodelom bogatstva i demokratizacijom društvenih struktura. Spoj ovih istorijskih vrednosti sa tekućom ekonomskom krizom potkrepljen je razmatranjem novih rezultata u SAD, gde su se u poslednje vreme pojavili elementi struktura samo-odlučivanja i demokratizacije rada. Posmatrana su dva slučaja prelaska na radničko vlasništvo u preduzećima Jeanette Sheet Glass i Rath Packing Company. Ova dva slučaja osvetljavaju procese borbe protiv zatvaranja industrijskih preduzeća, obezbeđenja kapitala za radničko preuzimanje kontrole, strukturisanja procesa informisanja i odlučavanja, kao i sam nivo istinske radničke kontrole. Iako je verovatno suviše rano da bi se ocenila dugoročna perspektiva ove alternativne forme organizacije u američkoj privredi, ovi slučajevi ukazuju, u najmanju ruku, na otvaranje mogućnosti da se samoupravljanje pojavi kao osnovni mehanizam kojim bi se kombinovao tradicionalni američki pragmatizam sa vizijom jednog boljeg sveta. Pored toga, implikacije pojave trećeg sektora vlasništva i kontrole u američkom društvu dovoljne su da ukažu na značajan procep u dominirajućem ekonomskom poretku.

## TEORIJSKO-METODOLOSKE OSNOVE TABELA MEĐUSEKTORSKIH ODNOSA PRIVREDNIH DELATNOSTI SR SRBIJE VAN TERITORIJA SOCIJALISTIČKIH AUTONOMNIH POKRAJINA U 1976. GODINI

Ljiljana TATAREVIĆ\*

1. Iako je Jugoslavija bila prva socijalistička zemlja koja je objavila tabelu međusobnih odnosa privrednih delatnosti za celokupnu narodnu privredu, problemu regionalne međusektorske analize se tek u novije vreme poklanja više pažnje. Nerazvijenost ovog metoda regionalne analize je posledica nerazvijenosti i nedostatka teorijskih koncepcija o regionalnom razvoju. Teorija i praksa planiranja narodne privrede dugo su bile zauzete rešavanjem problema šta proizvoditi u zemlji, a nisu davale odgovor na pitanje gde proizvoditi. Ovakav uski sektorski pristup u planiranju narodne privrede doveo je do zanemarivanja regionalnog aspekta privrednog razvoja što je prouzrokovalo i dalje postojanje izrazitog neravnomernog teritorijalnog razvoja Jugoslavije.

U savremenoj ekonomskoj literaturi sve više se ukazuje na jedinstvo sektorskog i teritorijalnog pristupa u planiranju privrednog razvoja, što zahteva novu metodološku osnovu za planiranje kako na regionalnom nivou, tako i na nivou narodne privrede u celini. Ali, ovde nije reč samo o neophodnosti modeliranja narodne privrede na nivou regiona. Takav zadatak se može posmatrati i potpuno odvojeno. Suština je u tome, da globalne makroekonomske proporcije ne mogu biti pravilno izražene ako se ne uzme u obzir i prostorni faktor u funkcionisanju ekonomije.

2. Prvi pokušaj primene međusektorske analize za usmeravanje regionalne privrede učinjen je u SR Hrvatskoj početkom 1964. godine. U Republičkom zavodu za planiranje SR Hrvatske konstatovano je da bi međusektorska analiza korisno poslužila u razradama srednjoročnog plana, pa je u tom cilju urađena međusektorska tabela privrede Hrvatske za 1962. godinu.

Veliko praktično iskustvo u izradi regionalnih tabela stečeno je u SR Sloveniji. Institut za ekonomska istraživanja u Ljubljani u saradnji sa Zavodom za statistiku SR Slovenije, sastavio je međusektorske tabele slovenačke privrede za 1966, 1968. i 1972. godinu. Tabele za 1974. godinu, koje je Zavod za statistiku SR Slovenije prvi put samostalno izradio, predstavljaju najkompletniji poduhvat te vrste u našoj zemlji.

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